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ABSTRACT 
In the context of rapid urbanisation and growing numbers of infonnal settlements in peri-urban 
areas of Cape Town, a development project was undertaken by the Cape Town, South Africa-
municipality, to provide Kosovo Infonnal Settlement with a new communal water and sanitation 
system that utilises vacuum sewerage technology. The purpose of the ethnographic study 
described here was: to establish the level of social acceptability of the new infrastructure post-
upgrade; to monitor how residents used the new and old water and sanitation systems; and to 
identify any other social or institutional barriers to providing water and sanitation services in 
similar contexts. After the completion of the study, the researcher found that the development 
project was a complete failure, because the residents could not use the infrastructure as intended; 
and, as a result, had reverted to using their old container toilet system. The primary aim of this 
dissertation is to describe the ways in which the municipality has engaged with residents and 
other stakeholders and to show how the inappropriateness of those engagements ultimately 
contributed to the project's failure. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
The rain did not make the comforting and relaxing sound of a light tapping against the window. 
Instead, the raindrops sounded like fierce bullets whizzing past in a police raid, as they hit and 
echoed off the corrugated iron siding and roof of the shack. 1 While I listened to my research 
assistant, Xoliswa,2 tell of her struggles in Kosovo informal settlement, I selfishly wished the rain 
would stop so I could hear her more clearly and take better notes. Retrospectively, I realise the 
harsh sound of the deluge of winter rain against her shack was the least of her concerns. For over 
a decade, whenever it rained, she had worried that her shack would flood and damage the few 
material items she had taken a lifetime to gather. She wondered if, outside her shack, the rain that 
mixed with faecal matter to form sewage pools might end up being where her neighbours' children 
would play. She wondered too about the large rodents that would invade her shack in search of 
food and a warm place to stay. 
Because of these concerns, she frequently talked about her dream of 'development '. From the 
moment she had set up her first shack in Kosovo, Xoliswa said, she had had high hopes that she 
would one day have a proper brick house with access to water and flush toilets; that it would be 
built in an area with constructed roads with adequate storm water drainage; that she would have 
access to an electricity supply and not have to 'steal' from friends in formalised settlements; that 
there would be parks, hospitals, and schools that others in the city took for granted. 
Unfortunately, Xoliswa had become disillusioned. For years now, the municipality had promised 
these 'development'items to the impoverished community of Kosovo, but had consistently failed to 
deliver on its spokespersons' pledges. 
1.1 Introduction 
Cries for 'development', such as Xoliswa's, were common in Kosovo informal settlement, where 
I conducted research from 7 June to 17 July 2009. Kosovo is just one example of the hundreds of 
illegal, informal settlements that have sprung up in and around Cape Town since its founding in 
the seventeenth century. These have appeared in ever-increasing numbers and size in the past 
two to three decades (Barry and Ruther 2005). Today these informal settlements are places 
where people live their everyday lives without proper housing, water or sanitation services, and 
often without any security of tenure. 
People from all over South Africa - particularly from other areas of Cape Town, and in a few 
cases, even from other parts of the continent - had settled in Kosovo in search of a better life 
than that they had experienced in their previous places. But instead, they had ended up living in a 
1 Shack is the term commonly used by Kosovo residents to refer to the informal dwellings in which they live. 
2 All names in this thesis are pseudonyms, including those of municipal officials and ward councillors. 
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shanty town for years on end. The rapid growth of infonnal settlements, such as Kosovo, has 
compelled the City of Cape Town (C of CT) to try and provide inexpensive, rudimentary 
services to the thousands of people living in them. 
For Kosovo such an intervention came towards the end of 2008, when the C of CT's municipal 
housing department implemented a shantytown upgrade that provided paved roads, stonnwater 
channels, communal toilet facilities, utilising vacuum sewerage technology, and potable water 
taps, ostensibly to deliver various social and health benefits. Yet, as of June 2009, it remained to 
be seen whether this infrastructure, particularly the toilets and taps, would be used regularly by 
the residents. It was in this context that the leader of the South African Water Research 
Commission (WRC)-funded project K5/l827, 'Improving Sewerage for South Africa', appointed 
me to conduct an ethnographic study of the residents' experiences with the new water and 
sanitation infrastructure, and, by implication, of their encounters with municipal officials in 
activities relating to the new system, before, during and after the upgrade process itself. During 
my research it soon became apparent to me that attempting to understand how Kosovo' s 
residents responded to and used the new vacuum sewerage technology would require that I also 
consider their experiences, good and/or bad, with the entire upgrade project, from inception to 
completion and utilisation. 
Because of the apparent social, health, and engineering benefits of vacuum sewerage (see section 
1.4), this development project was expected to be a huge success in improving the quality oflife 
of Kosovo's residents. However, as will be shown, the opposite, in fact, has proven to be the 
case. Indeed, as this study demonstrates, the Kosovo water and sanitation system upgrade can be 
seen as yet another example of a well-intentioned, yet unsuccessful, development project that 
failed because the implementing agency did not engage appropriately with the residents and 
other stakeholders (e.g. Hess, 1997; Moore and Vaughan, 1994; Porter et al., 1991; Richards, 
1985). 
1.2 Development Discourse 
Readers will notice that many of the various stakeholders quoted in this work use the word 
'development'. I point this out because the word has come to imply very specific meanings that 
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are not always the same for all those who use it. For that reason, it is necessary to offer a brief 
background in the form of a development discourse, and to understand why the term has been 
used as it has in the various contexts of the water and sanitation system upgrade; that is the 
central focus of this dissertation. 
Although defmed by the Oxford English Dictionary (2009) as, "gradual advancement through 
progressive stages, growth Within", development has taken on new meanings in the world of 
economics and politics. For instance, the Kosovo residents who clamoured for development 
defined it as: "brick houses" containing various items such as "indoor, flushing toilets"; being 
"safe from crime"; and having decent schools in which children could learn. In development 
literature, as in the Kosovo residents' vernacular, the word 'development' now conjures up 
specific images and language related to "improvements in wellbeing, living standards, and 
opportunities .. , historical processes of commodification, industrialisation, modernisation, or 
globalisation" (Edelman and Haugerud, 2005: 1). Thus, a discourse has emerged that "identifies 
appropriate and legitimate ways of practising development, as well as speaking and thinking 
about it" (Grillo, 1997: 12). 
Knowledge about development has been constructed historically and politically by countries and 
institutions in power that have wanted to present certain information as objective realities 
(Gardner and Lewis, 1996: 71). In the late 1940s countries with economic prowess, such as the 
United States, turned the poor people of other nations into objects of knowledge that could be 
studied and managed. Poverty itself was socially constructed and defmed in economic terms 
(Rahnema, 1992; Yapa, 1996) in order to promote specific agendas, such as expanding domestic 
markets, preventing communism and overpopulation, as well as fostering republican 
democracies (Escobar, 1995). To meet these objectives development projects were implemented 
throughout the world, and they: 
fostered a way of conceiving of social life as a technical problem, as a matter of rational 
decision making and management to be entrusted to that group of people - the development 
professionals - whose specialized knowledge allegedly qualified them for the task ... these 
professionals sought to devise mechanisms and procedures to make societies fit a pre-
existing model that embodied the structures and functions of modernity (Escobar, 1995: 52). 
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Through the implementation of development projects by development professionals who 
attempted to promote economic growth in 'poor' countries, labels such as 'third-world' and 
'underdeveloped' were given to nations that did not fit into norms created by modernity 
(Escobar, 1991). In other words, through the use of their power, international organisations, local 
development agencies, non-governmental organisations, and national planning agencies 
identified 'underdeveloped' and 'third-world' countries and defined them as 'abnormal', so that 
they could become objects of policies and plans. This entire process allowed those labels, along 
with the term 'development', to become naturalised and to filter down to ground level among 
those who were the beneficiaries of development interventions. An example is the way Kosovo's 
residents have internalised the discourse and have come to see their social situation as 
pathological, but remediable through 'development' interventions. 
Some post-development anthropologists (e.g. Escobar, 1991; Escobar, 1995; Ferguson, 1990; 
Illich, 1997; Sachs. 1993) have suggested that those who work in development have participated 
in reproducing a harmful development discourse (see Chapter Three) that perpetually 'others' 
populations of the global South through their representations of those populations and through 
their control over them. Those same post-deVelopment anthropologists argue that, understanding 
this, anthropologists should refrain from engaging in development and should instead contest the 
entire 'development industry'. 
While I agree that the predominant development discourse does indeed undermine the efficacy of 
many development experts' efforts to achieve their goals, I do not believe that either they or any 
other anthropologists should simply abandon all attempts to improve the quality of life for those 
they study or refrain from their work in the development industry. The fact is that, no matter 
what the original agenda and intentions of development programmes may have been, in many 
cases, such as in Kosovo, locals were themselves crying out for 'development'. As Simon (1997: 
182) has said, "The emphasis of much post-modem literature on playful, leisured, heterodoxical 
self-indulgence ... has little to offer those who can still only aspire to safe drinking water, a roof 
which does not leak and the like". This was the case for Kosovo and the residents with whom I 
worked. Simply put, like many people around the world, they were living in precarious and dire 
circumstances and were desperately in need of help. 
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1.3 History and Context of Kosovo Informal Settlemene 
The Kosovo informal settlement resulted from a partial land invasion in 1999 on private land 
owned by a private company, Laycrest (Pty) Ltd, located on the outskirts of Philippi, a suburb of 
Cape Town, South Africa (see Fig 1.1). Kosovo is just one of over 164 informal settlements that 
have emerged in Cape Town since the 1970s (Barry and Ruther 2005). Most residents in these 
settlements are people who have recently migrated from the rural Transkei and Ciskei regions in 
the Eastern Cape after the economic boom of the 1970s and the apartheid-era reforms in the 
1980s that gave land rights to the urban black population (ibid). Approximately 48,000 people 
migrate to Cape Town every year in search of job opportunities, and most ofthese end up in such 
informal settlements (ibid). 
In that respect, however, Kosovo is somewhat of an anomaly, in that most residents there came 
directly from other areas in Cape Town, rather than from the Eastern Cape. Most to whom I 
spoke said they had moved from other homes in Cape Town in order to start a life of their own 
away from their parents and siblings. In many instances, they said, their previous households had 
been growing and too many individuals were occupying one house or residential site. Other 
cases included previous 'backyard dwellers' - who no longer wanted to rent a shack in someone 
else's yard, so they had left their previous homes and moved to new land with very few 
resources-monetary or otherwise-to begin their new lives. 
Informants, who claimed to have been amongst the original settlers ('land invaders') in the area, 
explained that they had named it after the civil war-tom area of the former Yugoslavia.4 They 
added that, when people had first moved to the area, it was covered with trees that residents had 
removed in order to build their shacks - in several cases reportedly using the felled trees as poles 
for their new houses. Not long thereafter, the C of CT had demanded that the residents move, 
3 The historical background provided in this section was gathered from the oral histories of several residents, the 
Ward 33 Councillor, and the project manager ofthe upgrade. 
4 Naming newly-founded areas after historical events is apparently common among South Africans who do not have 
the skills to write down historical events. Kosovo was one among several other sites named for the same reason (e.g. 
Tsunami, Barcelona, Iraq, and Lusaka, just to name a few) (Gophe 2005). 
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because Laycrest had obtained an eviction order from the high court. Yet, residents held their 
ground and said they would not leave because they had not been offered anywhere else to settle.5 
Building houses from nothing and contending with those who wanted them to vacate the land 
was just the beginning of residents' hardships. From 1999 until 2005, Kosoyo residents endured 
a lack of basic services, such as electricity, water, sanitation, roads, schools, and storm water 
drainage. In addition, they had also to contend with living on low-lying land, used previously as 
a refuse dump and plagued by winter flooding, particularly in 2002, when many people lost their 
homes and were forced to move elsewhere (many reportedly returned to their extended families' 
homes in other parts of Cape Town). Others had to rely on leftover disaster relief food and 
Figure 1.1: Kosovo site context (Goven, 2007) 
5 A stipulation of the eviction order was that Laycrest had to provide alternative land or accommodation for those 
evicted. Since the company failed to do so, or to police the site adequately, the land was completely invaded shortly 
after the eviction order was issued. 
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blankets which agencies partnering with the C of CT had provided for people in neighbouring 
Samora MacheL6 
Some residents said that they had had the impression that the ward councillor was using the 
Kosovo residents' plight to get private donations from companies - which donations, they 
alleged, went directly into the pockets of the ward councillor and his friends. They recalled, for 
example, that Telkom had donated R75, 000, ostensibly for Kosovo residents who never received 
any of the money. This, I was told, had left the residents feeling resentful, sad, and defeated. As 
my research assistant, Xoliswa, put it, "We heard people saying that in 1994 we voted for 
freedom. But at Kosovo we didn't know the meaning of freedom. The freedom was only for the 
councillor and his colleagues". 
Residents also recalled that, in 2003, after the 2002 floodwaters had receded, large trucks had 
come to Kosovo and dumped rubbish (a mixture of stones, wood, and miscellaneous refuse) onto 
the land where shacks had previously stood, and that by the time their first ward councillor, Vusi 
Chambers,7 had managed to stop the dumping, large mounds of stinking refuse were present. 
Recalling the situation, Xoliswa said: "For about three months we didn't open the door because 
of the smell. Very early in the morning and when the sun set there was a smell like a perm 
lotion." Chambers had reportedly promised to organise trucks to bring soil to cover the trash 
heaps, but none had arrived. Consequently, residents collectively gathered money and paid truck 
drivers to come to Kosovo and level out the trash heaps so that they could rebuild their shacks. 
In addition to living on low-lying land that had previously been a dump and that flooded 
regularly, residents' hardships included living without access to running water. Laycrest had 
refused to provide rudimentary services - on the grounds that this would violate the terms of the 
eviction order. Before the installation of a single tap by the C of CT in 2004, residents had had to 
walk to Philippi Station or Samora Machel to buy water and to carry two or three 25-litre 
containers of water in trolleys over several kilometres every day. In 2004, Xoliswa remembered, 
6 Residents believed that neighbouring Samora Machel received disaster relief because it was a formally recognised 
settlement and Kosovo was not. 
7 This name, as all other personal names in this text - other than those of public figures such as Cape Town's mayor 
- is a pseudonym (see Chapter Two). 
7 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
"The queue was very long because it [the tap] was only one. But half a loaf is better than no 
bread. At that time we stopped renting [sic; paying] R30 a month for water in Samora". 
Not only did the single tap provide insufficient access to water for household pmposes, it was 
also inadequate at times in dealing with the shack fires which were reportedly a common 
occurrence, as they also were in other shack areas in the country (see Bank, 2001; Godwin et al., 
1997; Murray, 2009). With insufficient taps providing water to extinguish fires and lacking 
proper roads, fire fighters' efforts were severely constrained and many shacks were reportedly 
razed during those years. When, in mid-2004, the C of CT [mally purchased the land from 
Laycrest, the settlement was provided with more standpipe taps and with container toilets. 
Another year later, electricity was formally reticulated. Prior to that, many residents had formed 
groups of up to five shacks, pooling money for a cable (R200 for a 100 metre roll; several were 
needed), and connecting up informally to Samora Machel houses from whom they then 'rented' 
electricity - each group of five paying R200 per month. Often others would then hook into the 
cables and steal electricity. This frequently resulted in blackouts or electrical output dropping, 
along with overloading at peak times. Kosovo residents thus used electricity only for 
refrigerators and small appliances. Xoliswa explained: "The life was very difficult. To cook food 
we used a flame stove and lamp for light. Sometimes those electricity wires were stolen and then 
we must buy it again" (sic). 
In addition to lacking electricity, prior to 2005 residents did not have any form of sanitation 
system. They dug and installed pit latrines in the sandy soil of their yards. The sand's instability 
meant the pits frequently collapsed or filled up and had to be re-dug. Then, in 2005, the mayor of 
Cape Town, NomaIndiya Mfeketo, intervened to ensure that each shack was provided with its 
own container toilet that was cleaned twice weekly. Consequently, Kosovo residents, who lived 
there during that time, no longer had to use communal toilet facilities, although those who 
moved into Kosovo after 2005 had had to find people with whom they could share a toilet. 
It was only in 2008/9, with the settlement upgrade project mentioned earlier, that Kosovo 
residents were provided with a new water and sanitation system, with flushing toilets serviced by 
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a vacuum sewerage system. The C of CT built 45 communal units with six to thirteen toilet 
cubicles in each. Each unit also included one or two taps attached to an outside wall and placed 
over small, concrete washbasins draining into grate-covered drains leading into the vacuum 
sewerage system. Additional communal standpipe taps were also dispersed throughout the area. 
The upgrade also included a few paved roads along the settlement's major thoroughfares, as well 
as storm water drains. As is discussed later, very few of the taps and toilets were operational 
during my research period. Yet this was only six months after the upgrade had supposedly been 
completed. 
At the time of the water and sanitation system upgrade, there were an estimated 15,625 people 
living in 6,250 shacks in an area of 27 hectares (C of CT 2009). This works out at a population 
density of 579 people per hectare or about 40 square metres per residential site. Nearly all the 
residents that I interviewed (see Chapter Two for information about my methods and sampling 
techniques) said they anticipated moving to Kosovo, living there in a shack for a couple of years, 
and then being provided with a government-built brick-and-mortar house. As one resident, 
Mangaliso, put it, "We normally do this. We start from a shack and then move to bricks". 
Another middle-aged domestic worker, Nkosazana, said, "My dream was to be in a nice place. I 
thought Kosovo, by now, would be a good place ... because there are a lot of people who stay in 
posh houses ... RDP (Reconstruction and Development Programme) houses. I didn't think that 
by this year I would still be in the shacks". All the residents I consulted expressed similar hopes 
for better housing and for services that worked properly. Nearly a decade after the first settlers 
had moved to Kosovo, they were still waiting to get their 'posh', 'brick' houses from the 
government. While houses had not been forthcoming, the sewage system introduced as part of 
the upgrade had initially seemed promising. I now outline some of the technical details. 
1.4 Vacuum Sewerage Systems 
Part of Kosovo's 2008/9 water and sanitation system upgrade included the installation of a 
vacuum sewerage system, the first such installation of its kind in South Africa. According to the 
EPA (1991), vacuum sewerage systems have been used in Europe for over one hundred years 
and in the United States for the last few decades. They are considered a viable alternative to 
conventional gravity wastewater collection systems, since these can be extremely expensive to 
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install and are reliable only in specific contexts. Vacuum sewerage systems include three main 
components: collection chambers containing interface valves,8 sewer pipelines, and a central 
vacuum or pump station (Roediger, 2007) (See Fig. 1.2). Vacuum sewerage operates through the 
use of vacuum pumps that create differential air pressure in pipes, in order to move wastewater 
to tanks at the vacuum station (EPA, 1991). Conventional gravity sewerage systems require the 
use of 160mm diameter pipes and the construction of up to seven-metre-deep trenches. 
Vacuum sewerage, in contrast, can be reticulated through much narrower pipes; and these are 
laid in far shallower trenches (1.2 to 1.5 metres deep). In Kosovo 110mm waste pipes were laid 
from communal toilets and washbasins to collection chambers, one per communal unit. These 
were then drained intermittently when the interface valve was activated by the volume of waste 
in the collection chamber. The waste was drawn by a vacuum pump to a holding tank at the 
pump station, whence it drained and/or was pumped, now through conventional sewers, to the 
city's wastewater treatment works. 
Vacuum sewerage is reportedly particularly useful, reliable, and relatively inexpensive in the 
following environmental contexts: unstable soil, flat land, high water tables, restricted 
construction conditions, and urban development (EPA 1991). It is advantageous for such 
conditions because it uses smaller pipes and requires shallower installation depths than 
conventional sewerage, thus reducing excavation costs and environmental impacts. Not having to 
use large, heavy machinery for excavation allows local labour to be used during construction. 
Additionally, vacuum sewerage uses high velocities, so there is ostensibly a reduced risk of 
blockages; it allows installers to bypass unforeseen underground obstacles, since field-based 
changes can be made easily; it utilises only one source of power- electricity to drive a vacuum 
pump; and it allows for major leaks to be noticed quickly, thus preventing environmental 
contamination (EPA 1991). However, vacuum sewerage systems do have high capital costs; but 
they theoretically require very little maintenance because of high cleansing velocities, so that 
those capital costs can be recovered by savings in maintenance costs (Gibbs, 2008). 
8 The interface valves seal the sewerage lines in order to maintain the vacuum suction. They open to discharge the 
contents of a collection chamber when a sufficient volume has accumulated. 
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The installation of vacuum sewerage offered an apparently feasible alternative in Kosovo, given 
that the settlement was built over flat land with loose, sandy soil (Cape Flats 2009) and a high 
water table. Furthermore, it was very densely populated with shacks, and the residents were 
extremely reluctant to relocate their homes for construction - thus leaving little room left for the 
retrofitting of a gravity sewerage system. The installation required very limited excavation 
spaces and the system included few access chambers or manholes. Moreover, zigzagging sewer 
pipe lines were used to avoid the shacks as obstacles. This offered several comparative 
advantages over other waterborne sewerage systems, and with its reportedly reliable track record 
for over a century, a vacuum sewerage system seemed to be a sensible choice for the consultants 
and engineers who were commissioned to design and oversee Kosovo's upgrade. 
To the 
station r 
vaCllUln 
ill ill A.ir vent next to hOllse \Vastewatel" flows 
via gr-avity away 
from die l10nse 
Figure 1.1: Components of Vacuum Sewerage9 
1.5 Dissertation Structure 
Collection chamber 
Valve lUut 
Vacnum sewer 
line 
In the following chapters, I demonstrate how and why this particular aspect of the upgrade failed, 
at least in the short term, to achieve its objectives of providing safe and usable water and 
sanitation services to the Kosovo residents. In Chapter Two I elaborate on my research methods 
9 This diagram illustrates how vacuum sewerage would look when installed for one house. In Kosovo, it looked 
much like this, except it was installed next to a communal block of toilets rather than a single house. 
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and the specific study I was commissioned to do, as well as consider the ethical dilemmas and 
setbacks experienced in my fieldwork. The chapter also explains how and why my original 
research objectives were slightly different from those that have guided the writing of this 
dissertation. Chapter Three's brief review of the anthropological literature on other unsuccessful 
development projects and the reasons for their failure is offered to provide examples that 
corroborate my own ethnographic research conclusions. Chapter Four recaps the intended 
benefits of Kosovo's water and sanitation system upgrade and then explains why it was 
considered a failed project. I look there - in Chapter Four - at the current deterioration of the new 
infrastructure and the resulting dire consequences. Chapter Five is the first of three chapters that 
suggest possible reasons for the project's failure, concluding that the C of CT failed to provide 
adequate information to the residents before, during, and after the implementation of the new 
system, or to establish a local management system. Chapter Six sho s that the C of CT' s lack of 
knowledge of local politics handicapped its agents in their efforts to get the development project 
off the ground and to develop a system for local management. Chapter Seven documents the 
extent to which the failure of co-operation between the ward councillor and officials from several 
municipal departments undermined their respective efforts to implement the project. In my 
conclusion I return once more to my main argument and demonstrate the importance of 
appropriate interactions between developers and beneficiaries in regard to successful 
development projects. 
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CHAPTER TWO: RESEARCH METHODS 
2.1 The Study 
The overarching aim of the WRC project K5/1827, 'Improving sewerage for South Africa', on 
which I worked as a short-tenn ethnographic research consultant, was to fmd cost-effective water 
and sanitation system technologies that could be used in low-income, infonnal settlement 
upgrades, as there is a growing need for sewerage in the rapidly expanding urban areas of the 
global South. To accomplish this, the project hoped: to establish comparative advantages (and 
disadvantages) of alternatives to conventional sewerage technologies; to make adjustments to 
existing technologies used in an infonnal settlement context; and to derive infonnation from 
existing pilot cases where alternative sewerage had been used. My role within this large 
undertaking was to examine the particular case study of Kosovo. The project leader, a civil 
engineer, called me in as a social anthropology student and negotiated a brief - asking me to 
conduct a study that would assess the success or failure of the newly piloted sewerage system, as 
well as the social acceptability for residents and municipal officials (see Appendix I for the full 
official brief). 
I created a practical set of objectives to guide my research. Firstly, I decided to establish the level 
of social acceptability of the new water and sanitation system by looking at how the new 
infrastructure had been received by the residents. Implicit to this objective was finding out what 
they knew about the technology and how that in tum would influence their acceptance or use of 
it. Secondly, I wanted to identify how residents in Kosovo used the water and sanitation 
infrastructure to wash, bathe, cook, and carry out other everyday life tasks. I anticipated that such 
infonnation would be useful for urban planners and engineers when designing future infonnal 
settlement upgrades. Thirdly, I thought it necessary to determine whether any other institutional 
or social barriers evident in the Kosovo pilot project were hindering the provision of adequate 
water and sanitation services. My research findings were written up in a report for the project 
leader in August 2009. However, this dissertation is based primarily on fmdings that emerged in 
relation to my third research objective, as it became apparent that it was difficult for the residents 
to utilise the new infrastructure for their daily activities, let alone accept the technology, when 
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there were many institutional hurdles that prevented the system from working properly in the 
first place. 
I conducted a six-week ethnographic investigation from 8 June to 17 July 2009 in Kosovo, with 
the help of two locally resident research assistants. During two of those weeks, I resided in a 
shack with one of my research assistants. Data were collected in many varied contexts, including 
periods when I spent nights in the area, periods spent talking informally to people in the streets -
or, more accurately, the dirt paths of Kosovo - and in stations along the Cape Flats train routes, 
in Cape Town's municipal offices, in local spaza ShOpS10 selling 'smiley's' (roasted sheep 
heads), and in residents' living rooms. Data were also gathered from more mundane contexts, 
like the insides of bucket toilet cubicles. Furthermore, data were gathered by means of various 
activities, ranging from participation in housing protests to morning bathing routines and 
sangoma (traditional healer) ceremonies. 
2.2 Entering the Field 
Prior to receiving my brief from the WRC project leader, I had conducted reconnaissance 
research for a few days in Kosovo for a class project in April 2009. This short fieldwork 
exercise, meant to give students practice with working in the development industry, allowed me 
to gain several contacts within Kosovo and the C of CT, as well as to obtain superficial 
information about the initial results of the sewerage system upgrade. This basic information 
enabled me to develop a set of questions to ask residents when I began my research. 
In preparation for my research, I presented a project proposal to the Social Anthropology 
department at the University of Cape Town and gained their ethical approval. Additionally, 
knowing that my security would be a concern in the context of a South African urban 
shantytown, I contacted Xoliswa, whom I had met during my reconnaissance fieldwork exercise, 
before commencing fieldwork. I asked her if she would be interested in working as my research 
assistant. I told her that it would require her to be available every day, any time of the day or 
night, throughout the duration of my work. I explained that I would want her to accompany me 
in all my activities in the settlement, to introduce me to possible contacts, to act as a Xhosa-to-
10 Spaza shops are informal convenience stores in South Africa. 
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English translator when necessary, and to help me to fmd a place to reside. She was more than 
willing to take on the task, and went so far as to fmd another friend, Thandiwe, who was also 
willing to help me. Both were eagerly waiting to begin on the day I arrived. 
2.3 Methods 
My primary research method was open-ended, informal interviewing. Initially, I went around to 
all the communal flush-toilet facilities and engaged in informal conversations with residents in 
their immediate vicinity. Throughout these very informal exchanges, I gathered the names of 34 
individuals who appeared particularly vocal and seemed to have important stories to tell about 
their experiences with the water and sanitation system upgrade. I originally chose 34 individuals 
because I thought, given the time frame of the project, I would not be able to conduct several in-
depth interviews with more than that many informants. 
Finally, I ended up with just 23 resident informants. This was due to time constraints, residents 
being unavailable, and a couple residents deciding they did not want to share their experiences. 
Only seven of the 23 were men. Although I attempted to include equal numbers of each gender, 
the fact that interviews were conducted during working hours and by a woman assisted by 
another woman meant that women were more readily available than men. I also chose to conduct 
interviews with the Kosovo upgrade project manager in the C of CT municipality, the two 
municipal officials who took over the administration and maintenance of the system post-
installation, the ward 33 councillor, the engineering consultant who designed the sewerage 
system, and the Samora Machel resident hired by the municipality to monitor the new 
infrastructure in Kosovo. I chose to interview these individuals, since they were all important 
stakeholders who could share their experiences in implementing and managing the Kosovo 
upgrade. 
Throughout the study I followed up my initial conversations near the toilets in some of those 
people's homes at times that were convenient for them. Often, I came with a set of prepared 
questions. However, as people began to respond, new questions emerged and the conversations 
took unexpected directions, often leading to new, previously unanticipated questions. What this 
meant was that residents took the conversations in any direction they chose, but were then guided 
15 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
back to those issues that seemed pertinent to the study. This method was used with the 23 
Kosovo residents, as well as the other stakeholders who were not resident in Kosovo. 
I also used participant observation, a method that allowed me to monitor vigilantly the behaviour 
and actions of individuals and groups in Kosovo. In most cases, I was actively involved as a 
participant in the same activities that I observed. This method allowed me to observe and ask 
spontaneous questions about behaviours, as they occurred. During the two weeks I resided in 
Kosovo, I tried to limit my interviews and to focus only on participant observation. Finally, I 
also conducted an unofficial count of all the new communal toilet facilities and the taps located 
on the communal blocks (See Tables 2.1 and 2.2). Doing that allowed me to see which toilets 
and taps were working, which were locked (See Table 2.3), which had been vandalized, and 
which had been modified by residents to minimise any damages from overflowing sewage. 
Throughout these exercises, I kept a fieldworkjoumal and took photographs to record visual and 
verbal data. 
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Communal Toilet Blocks (N=4S) Individual Toilet Cubicles in Toilet 
Blocks (N=403) 
Type of Sewerage (N=) Type of Sewerage (N=) 
System System 
Vacuum 41 Vacuum 369 
Gravity 3 Gravity 29 
Incomplete 1 Incomplete 5 
Table 2.1: Unofficial count ofthe new communal and individual toilet faciJities ll 
Taps Attached to Communal Toilet Blocks (N=84) 
Functional Status (N=) 
Missing 70 
PresentINot Working 9 
PresentfVVorking 5 
Table 2.2: Unofficial count of the new taps attached to the communal block facilities 
Completed Individual Toilet Cubicles in Toilet Blocks (N=398) 
Functional Status (N=) 
Locked with Padlock or Wire 307 
UnlockedINot Working 91 
UnlockedINot Working/Unclean (filled with 88 
faeces and anal cleansing materials) 
UnlockedINot Working/Clean 3 
Table 2.3: Unofficial functional status of completed individual toilets 
11 I have excluded individual container toilets from my unofficial count, although they were still present. They were 
used and serviced whilst I conducted my research. The tables in this section include only the flushing toilets that 
were part of the 2008/9 upgrade. 
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2.4. Ethical Considerations 
Several issues arose during my research that posed potential ethical dilemmas. The fIrst was that 
investigating sanitation issues and residents' use of water might include the possibility of 
encountering individuals in private moments, such as defecating, urinating, and bathing. I never 
intentionally tried to observe such activities and have written only about what I observed in 
public spaces. Moreover, even then, I have avoided using personal names so as to avoid 
embarrassing individuals. Additionally, whenever speaking with residents, I informed them that 
any information they gave me would be utilised for my consultancy report, for my thesis, and for 
other possible published papers; and I asked them each time to decide whether or not to 
participate. I have also kept identifIcation information confIdential by using pseudonyms in all 
documents that others might see, including this dissertation. Finally, from the moment my 
research commenced, I made known my motives to everyone I encountered, including the ward 
councillor and other C of CT offIcials. I did not want residents to think that I was there to solve 
all their problems with the sanitation system. Rather, I told them, I was there to do research and 
convey their stories and opinions to other researchers who might be able to improve the 
experience of informal settlement upgrades elsewhere in the country. 
2.5 Fieldwork Setbacks 
While in Kosovo, I encountered very few setbacks. I had been particularly concerned about my 
personal safety since the Cape Flats settlements are reportedly crime-ridden. Fortunately, I was 
never a victim of the crimes to which so many others fall prey. Indeed, I experienced the 
opposite, with most people I met being very friendly and welcoming me into the area, and being 
eager to offer their opinions about the new sewerage system, and to allow me into their shacks 
for refuge from the winter rains. Though I was never terrorised by people, other unexpected 
'terrorists' took over each night while I stayed in Xoliswa's shack: bedbugs, mice, and rats! 
I had never realised how afraid I was of pests before I spent my fIrst night there. It started out 
well until I awoke around 2:00 a.m. to the sound of scuttling in my nearby duffle bag. I turned on 
the light in time to see a mouse dash across the floor and out from one of the cracks in the 
shack's sidewall. I was utterly terrifIed and could not fall asleep for the rest of the night. The 
next few nights I slept with the lights and TV on to drown out the sound of rodents. However, 
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this tactic did not work very well when rats were trying to climb through the cracks in the wall, 
and I could still hear their persistent scratching throughout the night. Despite this, one might 
consider me lucky since I never woke up with bites being taken out of my ears or fmgers, as 
reportedly often happens to babies in informal settlements. I did, however, suffer from bedbug 
bites that dotted my body. The upside to this situation was that I was always up and eager for 
another day of fieldwork, well before the crack of dawn! 
2.6 Self-reflection 
While conducting my research I was always conscious of how my social positioning might affect 
the data I gathered and how residents would perceive me when I was in Kosovo. I am a 24-year-
old, Caucasian,12 American graduate student. Would they view me as just another uMlungu13 
who was there to espouse partisan politics? Would they take me more or less seriously than they 
might a South African who came to conduct the same research? Those are some of the questions 
I still contemplate months after the conclusion of my research. 
As it turned out, there were a few young Kosovo women who refused to talk to me and 
participate in my research because they feared their husbands would be angry if they engaged in 
'politics'. Even though I told those women I was a student at UCT, they were still convinced that 
I was 'working for the government' and would use any information they gave me for political 
purposes. For the most part, however, residents seemed keen to talk to me, since they viewed me 
as someone who could get resources for them (e.g. jobs, contact with the municipality). 
Furthermore, my 'Americanness' became an advantage because many residents were impressed 
with me for "staying in the shacks" and were eager to show an American how they lived - so 
that I could go back to the United States and tell others. The advantage of being American was 
also enhanced by Barack Obama's then recent election as the first black American president. 
Residents were often eager to talk to me, if for no other reason than to ask me what I thought of 
Obama's presidency. This proved to be a great segue into conversations about their own local 
situation and some of the politics surrounding the upgrade. 
12 In South Africa people often categorise me as belonging to the white racial category; however, in the United 
States, based on my phenotypical characteristics, I am rarely categorized that way. 
\3 uMlungu is the isiXhosa term for a white person. 
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I also worried about how municipal officials and other stakeholders would perceive me. It 
crossed my mind that they would not take my research seriously and would make little effort to 
talk to me, as I was only a Master's student. Luckily for me, all the municipal officials I sought 
to speak to made themselves available for interviews and seemed to take an interest in my 
research. However, after I had completed my research, they all seemed very reluctant to consider 
my recommendations, being more interested in the technical recommendations made by my civil 
engineering colleagues, who were also working on the bigger WRC project. 
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CHAPTER THREE: AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 
ON PREVIOUSLY FAILED DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS 
3.1 Introduction 
Ongoing debates among anthropologists in academia and those involved in development revolve 
around a moral dilemma that positions anthropologists as experts with the potential to provide 
ground-breaking, beneficial information for development programmes that could improve the 
quality of life for the poor, while at the same time being seen by some as complicit in the loss of 
cultural integrity and the underdevelopment of beneficiaries (Bennett 1988; Gow 2002). 
According to one anthropological view, development projects are lost causes that are actually 
detrimental to the societies they supposedly serve. The post-development literature that 
represents that view argues that development is a problematic discourse. It attempts to speak for 
others (Escobar 1995; Everett 1997); it views life as a technical problem that can only be fixed 
by professionals from the West (Escobar 1995); it re-inscribes the inequalities present during 
colonialism (Gupta 1998); it creates desires and aspirations among populations that will never be 
fully met (lllich 1997); it traps people between tradition and modernity (Sachs 1993); and [mally, 
it masks the political nature of development (Ferguson 1990). Furthermore, Escobar (1991) 
suggests that when anthropologists work for development organisations or governments 
undertaking development projects, they are usually subjected to positivist research methods that 
preclude the possibility of an open critique of aspects of the project cycle. This, in turn, leads to 
their complicity in the destructive nature of development. 
Another view has it that anthropologists should be involved in development projects (e.g. Conlin, 
1985; Curtis, 1985; Goldschmidt, 1986) precisely because poor people remain concerned with 
modernising and improving their own standards of living by having their basic needs met 
(Simon, 1997). As Gow (2002) contends, anthropologists should become involved - precisely 
because they have the capacity and skills to utilise research methods that will allow them: to give 
people a say in programmes that affect them; to confront and contest presuppositions that are 
foundations for development policies and programmes; to analyse patterns of social organisation 
that could improve the management of projects; and to provide a view of development from 
below. Furthermore, Hoben (1982) says that anthropologists also: provide reliable quality data 
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that can be used to design surveys for larger-scope research; have the potential to illuminate the 
interests of local elites, which may facilitate the design and implementation of policies and 
programmes; and can offer lessons learned from failed development projects. 
It is the last of these benefits that I explore in this chapter. While previous development 
programmes may have had disastrous effects, I believe such programmes have the potential to 
provide exemplary services and improve the quality of life for the beneficiaries - if only 
development officials were to learn from their mistakes and to learn to utilise anthropological 
expertise or research methods in the course of implementing their projects. With this in mind, in 
this chapter I provide a survey of a specific sub-section of development literature that provides 
an anthropological perspective on reasons certain development projects have failed. I argue that 
many development projects have failed in one way or another because developers were unaware 
of or ignored local knowledgel4, or because they failed to correctly employ participatory 
methods 15 in their projects. As I demonstrate later, my own research adds to this body of work. 
3.2 Failed Development Projects: Lack of Local Knowledge 
In anthropological development literature one common theme that crops up is that developers 
rarely utilise local knowledge - which intended beneficiaries hold about their environment and 
local practices - when designing and implementing a development project. According to authors 
such as Porter et al. (1991), indigenous knowledge systems (see Chapter Six), which include 
local histories of the people they aim to help, are rarely utilised by development professionals, 
and so their projects frequently fail. That is because such projects are often ahistorical in nature 
and are "designed as if time began with the project implementation schedule. Past lessons are 
seldom examined and still fewer professionals bother to enquire into the historical circumstances 
ofthe people their interventions seek to assist" (porter et aI., 1991: xv). 
Porter et aL argue that, in the process of uncovering local histories, development professionals 
can also discover useful local knowledge about environmental conditions. They describe one 
14 The tenn 'local knowledge' or 'indigenous knowledge' is defined and described in Chapter Six. 
15 Participatory methods and their usefulness are described in Chapter Five. 
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such development endeavour, the Magarini Settlement Project in Kenya that took place from 
1976 to 1989. Because it did not do this, it subsequently failed. It was an Australian-funded 
project that attempted to end slash-and-burn agriculture - an agricultural production process 
which was seen by the developers as inefficient, especially given increasing population - among 
Girama families, and to introduce farming schemes that required families to settle on plots of 
land and engage in modem, irrigated farming techniques. The development project did not 
succeed, say Porter et aI., because the developers did not provide equipment suitable for local 
ecological conditions. As a result, the intended beneficiaries were eventually evicted from their 
land because they could not make payments for the farm land - bought from the project 
developers - due to poor harvests. Ultimately, Porter et ai. (1991) show that, by neglecting to 
learn about local ecological conditions, the developers had planned an inappropriate agricultural 
intervention. This led to an increasing encroachment onto and into Girama lands and livelihoods. 
Similarly, Richards' (1985) work in West Africa offers another prime example where developers 
ignored local knowledge available to them about ecological conditions and traditional 
agricultural practices. Richards explored a development programme instigated by the colonial 
powers in West Africa that attempted to convince local farmers to grow rice using modem, 
scientific agricultural methods. The new methods generated extremely acidic soils that actually 
led to a decline in harvested crops. Locals eventually deserted those methods and resumed their 
own which were better suited to their environment. Richards found that local farmers tended to 
adapt their methods to the ecological conditions, rather than simply attempting to overcome 
them. Richards' work brings to the fore a commonly held assumption by developers that all 
technological change is good and therefore adequate. In this case, that assumption proved to be 
false and so the project failed. 
Moore and Vaughan (1994) also developed the theme of showing how the knowledge of local 
values and priorities can be instrumental in the success of an agricultural development project. 
They demonstrated how programmes to end citimene (slash and bum) agriculture and to 
introduce resettlement schemes in Zambia - which gave Bemba people agricultural loans and 
small plots of land to participate in cash cropping - actually contributed to declining levels of 
nutrition among those people. This, Moore and Vaughan (1994) pointed out, was because 
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women had to spend increased amounts of time - compared to the time prior to cash-crop 
farming - on these farms which produced very little revenue. This ultimately took away from the 
amount of time they spent in their citimene gardens and in preparing meals for themselves and 
their children. The authors demonstrated how historical sources and ethnography may be used to 
shed light on local knowledge about farming practices and gendered labour relations. In this 
case, they did what developers had failed to do: they elucidated how Bemba women had 
historically prioritised time in citemene gardens; and how this ultimately provided them with 
optimal nutrition and time to spend with their children. 
Fisher (2004) looks at yet another economic development project, this one introduced in the 
Swat Valley in Pakistan, and whose agents attempted, through it, to persuade local residents to 
grow seed potatoes for export to the Punjab. Unfortunately, the crop was not well-received 
because the development agents had erroneously assumed farmers were interested in producing 
large quantities of seed potatoes that were very large in size. Consequently, any attempts to 
grow seed potatoes were abandoned by the local farmers because they had little use for a product 
that did not produce a reliable yield. Shortly thereafter, a local man experimented with the seed 
potatoes to see which conditions would be best for quick growth, since local people tended to be 
more interested in crop reliability than in generating large volumes of produce. He was interested 
"in the application of that knowledge in a way that worked towards his goals. Because his goals 
were derived from his local, culture-based knowledge, he produced a result that was acceptable 
and accepted by others in his society as useful" (Fisher, 2004: 27). Fisher describes how his 
experiments were successful. He found a way to produce a strain of seed potato that was adapted 
to local conditions. The economic development programme was re-introduced in later years and 
was subsequently considered to be successful. Once again, this example demonstrates how easy 
it is for developers to make false assumptions about the priorities and values of those they aim to 
help. Local knowledge of agricultural values and priorities is imperative in any successful 
development programme. 
Two further compelling examples demonstrate the importance of understanding local priorities 
and values. De Waal (2005) studied the types of aid beneficiaries received during the 1984/5 
famine in Darfur, Sudan. He argues that the three million sacks of grain donated by relief 
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agencies were misconceived, since there was no evidence that they saved any more lives than 
were saved through local survival strategies already in place. Furthermore, he contends, the aid 
agencies should have investigated local responses to famine because, as it turned out, during the 
worst famines, families did not spend money on food. They would have rather gone hungry, he 
says, than give up their way of life - keeping livestock alive and preserving enough resources to 
cultivate during the rainy season. Since this was the case, De Waal recommended that 
development programmes should aim at buying animals and livestock fodder as a means of 
complementing local coping strategies. 
Davies (1996) also conducted an analysis of famine-coping strategies, this one in Mali. Along 
similar lines to those argued by De Waal, Davies makes the argument that policy makers would 
do better to utilise monitoring systems that examine people's behaviour during social, ecological, 
and economic crises, rather than only considering indicators such as crop yields. Her approach 
emphasises the dynamism in people's coping strategies, and thereby shows the need to integrate 
disaster relief with other development projects. Both these examples show how locals have 
learned to adapt and cope during famines. Their methods of coping have much to do with their 
priorities - and therefore appropriate development programmes should also be designed with 
such priorities in mind in order to have the ultimate level of effectiveness. 
In one [mal example, I would like to show how local knowledge of health and illness may also 
be vital to the success of a development project. Hess (1997) describes how the development 
program PROFOGAN, in highland Ecuador during the early 1990s, promoted a veterinary 
campaign aimed at providing anti-parasitic treatments to livestock, so that fewer animals would 
die, thus, it was hoped, increasing the incomes of farmers who sold livestock for cash. After the 
first injections, locals observed several of their livestock dying. They attributed the deaths to the 
injections of the treatment which, according to custom, were actually understood to cool down 
the body of an individual and to cause sickness in an animal that is already thermally balanced or 
healthy. Because the programme did not incorporate indigenous notions of illness into its plan, 
the developers failed to persuade the locals of the curative effects of the treatments, and so the 
locals resisted repeating the treatment plan on their own, believing that the vaccines only caused 
more of their livestock to get sick and die. According to Hess, even though the NGO personnel 
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did not subscribe to any of the local beliefs about aetiologies, diagnoses and treatments, if they 
had been informed of them they could have tailored their development programme in such a way 
that resonated with the residents' beliefs so they would be more likely to adopt the programme 
and repeat it. 
Consideration of these failed development projects demonstrates the need to incorporate 
indigenous or local knowledge into the planning and design of development intervention 
programmes. Behaviour is the product of rational and practical decisions made by locals to meet 
their needs without introducing risks and costs (Hoben 1982). Because of this, development 
professionals should not discard the knowledge locals have to offer. When they discard such 
knowledge or fail to seek it, they run the risk of making erroneous assumptions that can 
compromise an entire development project. 
3.3 Failed Development Projects: Lack of Participatory Methods 
Other anthropologists describe examples of development projects that have failed as a result of a 
lack of participation by those who were meant the intended beneficiaries. Mason (1986) tells of 
his experience working for a development agency that provided monetary aid for an informal 
settlement upgrade at Ben M'Sik in Casablanca, Morocco. The project's attempt to build new 
homes and provide water, electricity, roads, and educational centres to thousands of residents 
failed, he points out, because of a lack of residents' participation. He argued that developers 
involved in the project did not fully understand what participation meant; and they thought that a 
socio-economic survey of inhabitants was sufficient as a means to engage them in the work of 
the project. Furthermore, as Mason points out, the developers were afraid of interacting with Ben 
M'Sik's poor urban residents, and feared that allowing them too much input into the project's 
work might incite them to riot. Ultimately, the project was terminated because they feared 
explosive riots and, as a result, nothing was accomplished. 
Another development project that attempted to use participatory methods, but failed to do so in a 
way that was promoted by the beneficiaries themselves, has been reported on by West (2006). In 
her ethnography of a 'conservation-as-development' programme in Maimafu, Papua, New 
Guinea, West describes a development programme that made an effort at providing 
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'development' - defmed as cash by the conservationists - in exchange for the local Gimi 
people's participation in conservation programmes. The Gimi were required to give up hunting-
a traditional source of subsistence - and cutting down trees in their forest, and to participate 
instead in coffee planting and bilum bag production for sale in exchange for cash. In return, the 
Gimi expected to receive homes with tin roofs, hospitals, and schools. Yet, all West reports they 
received was small amounts of money for their hard work. Both parties in this relationship thus 
became dissatisfied with the other because they were not getting what they wanted out of the 
programme. The Gimi occasionally continued to hunt and encroach upon the forest, which 
annoyed the conservationist-developers, while at the same time the Gimi's work load stretched 
their labour force too thin, which made them weary. Perhaps these effects could have been 
mitigated if the conservationists had approached the Gimi and asked for their opinions about 
appropriate forms of participation and what they expected in return for their conservation efforts. 
3.4 Conclusion 
Since World War II, numerous development projects have been attempted and implemented 
throughout the world. Unfortunately, as the anthropological literature shows, that world is 
littered with examples of failed development projects. Most analyses have focused on 
agricultural and economic development projects that were unsuccessful in utilising local 
knowledge. As a result, those studies now show, projects were planned without any knowledge 
of local conditions, priorities, values and behaviours, and thus employed false assumptions, drew 
on poor information, and proposed inappropriate solutions. The literature also indicates that 
such project failure may result from any lack of appropriate participation by intended 
beneficiaries. If people are not adequately consulted or integral to their own deVelopment, then 
they may lose confidence in the project and abort it altogether. 
As I aim to show in the chapters that follow, many of these same kinds of problems manifested 
in the Kosovo informal settlement water and sanitation system upgrade that was the focus of my 
own research and to which I now turn. I do so with the intention of being able, through 
identifying some of the pitfalls that anthropological approaches can reveal, to provide developers 
with information on how they might be able to improve their attempts to develop local situations 
of extreme poverty where people themselves seek what they call 'development'. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: CURRENT USE -OR NOT-OF THE NEW 
WATER AND SANITATION SYSTEM 
"He [John Graves, project manager] guaranteed the toilets by saying they come from 
Germany. They are a new system. They are number one. They are not blocking even when 
people use cement papers. Even the drains can't block - just like the ones in Samora 
Machel." (Xoliswa, research assistant) 
4.1 Introduction 
Kosovo residents told me that in 2008/9 they were initially eager and thrilled to be the lucky 
recipients of 'development', which included new flush toilets, wash basins, grey water drains and 
taps. As the quote above indicates, the residents were promised a superb product. That meant 
they could [mally do away with container toilets in favour of flush toilets - a common symbol of 
respectability in the Cape Flats informal settlements (Ross 2005). The C of CT and its 
consultants had decided that, for financial reasons, the new facilities would be communal rather 
than each residential site having its own toilet and tap. My informal count of the facilities 
indicated that 369 such toilets had been provided and linked to the vacuum sewerage system, in 
45 toilet blocks (see Table 2.1). They were installed in addition to 29 toilets using gravity 
sewerage (and five toilets that were started, but never completed). At the 44 completed 
communal facilities, there were 84 taps in total. Despite the presence of the new facilities, 
however, residents quickly returned to - and in some cases never stopped - using container 
toilets. In this chapter I will show why this occurred and why the development project failed, 
since the residents would not use the toilets and taps as intended (i.e. for ablutions as well as 
collecting water for drinking, bathing, cooking, washing, and extinguishing fires, etc.). 
The residents had a promlsmg new infrastructure that effectively - and paradoxically -
exacerbated an already dire public health situation. I will show that the failure of the project 
forced residents to revert to using container toilets. This ultimately caused friction between the C 
of CT and the residents - particularly on the issue of who was to blame for the development 
disaster. 
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4.2 Condition and (Un)usability of the New Water and Sanitation System 
Walking Kosovo's dusty back roads in June 2009, 1 found it hard not to notice the litter - ranging 
from empty chip bags to used condoms and brick fragments surrounding the shacks, themselves 
constructed from pieces of mismatched corrugated iron, with fences of colourful, plastic crate 
sections. From a distance, it appeared that the settlement, made of randomly discarded items and 
iron, was interrupted in places by sterile looking, new concrete structures. These were the 
communal, flushing toilet blocks, built only six months prior to the beginning of my research. 
Closer inspection showed that they were far from clean or sanitary - contrary to what their 
designers had intended. It also showed that some individual toilet cubicles within each block, 
especially those in unlocked stalls, were in complete disrepair. Yet from the residents' 
comments, many of the locked toilet stalls also contained inoperable t ilets - because they were 
connected to the same vacuum sewerage line that was blocking. 1 observed many toilet bowls 
filled to the brim with unflushed faeces, urine, and various types of paper. In many other cases, 
the toilets themselves were damaged: several toilet seats/lids had fallen off and lay to the side of 
the bowl; in others bowl rims were cracked, flush levers loose, inlet and/or outlet pipes broken 
and leaking - many of them apparently being of inferior materials - and creating pools of water 
and waste around the bowl's base. In one case, a resident pointed out a toilet bowl near her shack 
that had become completely detached from the cubicle floor. 
All the residents 1 spoke with throughout the entire duration of my fieldwork had, they said, 
stopped using the new toilets and reverted to the container toilets within the immediate vicinity 
of their shacks. Indeed, residents complained that the new toilets had never worked properly in 
the first place. Some claimed that when the toilets had been completed at the beginning of 2009, 
they had worked for only a couple of weeks before becoming blocked, and then overflowing -
something residents attributed to the way the toilets had been built by the contractors. For 
instance, a woman said, "I think it is that collection chamber which is wrong [the problem], 
because when we open that main tap, the toilet [sewage] comes out of that collection chamber." 
Other residents thought the problems stemmed from the cisterns in each cubicle, because there 
was insufficient water pressure when they flushed the toilets, so that water just trickled into the 
bowl. Some residents had then reportedly resorted to dumping a bucket of water into the bowl to 
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aid the flushing, though in some instances that simply exacerbated sewage overflows at the 
nearest collection chamber. Still other informants complained that the outlet pipes were too 
small, especially for the kinds of items they commonly flushed, such as cement and flour sack 
papers and newspaper, all ofwhich were used as anal cleansing materials. 
One of the residents' most common criticisms was that the toilets had been constructed with 
substandard, cheap plastic materials. Yet, when the C of CT-based project manager, John 
Graves, was asked why such materials, deemed shoddy by residents, had been used, he replied: 
Weare working very strictly towards national norms, standards and guidelines. We will not 
tolerate any inferior material ... The people; they see plastic taps as inferior material. We all 
agree a plastic tap is inferior to a brass tap or a metal tap, we know that, but a brass tap will 
last, at most, 24 hours, after that it's gone. Unfortunately, we are dealing with vandalism and 
the theft of material. .. So, in some cases, yes, there are much better materials we could use, 
but we know that it won't last...I promise you, it won't last for 24 hours. 
From what he said, it appeared that Graves believed that any building materials of value would 
be stolen from the facilities by people hoping to make money on the scrap metal market. 
Therefore, he did not want to spend money on superior materials that would frequently need to 
be replaced when stolen. Contrary to this reasoning, Bob Storm at Urban Engineers16 - the 
company used to advise the C of CT on the upgrade and design of the new infrastructure - said 
that budgetary constraints had been the problem: "Through the interaction between the project 
committee and the City [of Cape Town], it was decided to create systems and we can only put in 
a certain quality for the money available." In other words, Urban Engineers chose 'inferior' 
materials because the C ofCT did not provide them with an adequate budget for better materials. 
The toilets' state of disrepair and the alleged cheap materials used by the C of CT were not the 
only concerns that residents complained about. They also complained about heaps of faeces and 
large volumes of sewage coming up from the gullies in the grey water drains below the wash 
basins (See Picture 4.1). In some cases, water slowly trickled from the base of the collection 
chambers and the control valves of the water mains. These are located within a metre radius from 
16 Urban Engineers is a pseudonym for the real engineering consulting finn. 
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the communal toilet blocks and, in most cases, from residents' homes. As the water leaked out of 
the ground, it flowed through the outlying sand and dirt into residents' shacks. 
The problem with water leaking out of the gullies, manholes, and control valves was a common 
difficulty throughout Kosovo, and residents were forced to deal with the problem themselves. As 
one frustrated woman remarked, "Where am I going to put the water? I just dig a hole. And here 
when you dig, the water comes out easily. I have to stay with the water in my shack with my 
children." She was one of several residents I witnessed digging trenches in the soil outside their 
shacks so that the sewage would have an alternative route to flow, instead of into their shacks. 
They also often took matters into their own hands and filled the system's gullies with soil and 
large stones or covered them with boards, hoping thus to prevent sewage flowing out of the 
drains. 
The new taps attached to the communal blocks of toilets were also in a state of complete 
disrepair. The cement wash basins located below the taps were full of cracks and, in many cases, 
contained backed-up, dirty water and rubbish. For the five taps that were working, the residents 
who lived in the vicinity had very few complaints. However, of the remaining 79 new taps that 
had been installed, the residents complained that they were also made out of inexpensive 
materials and were installed in a substandard manner. As one man said, "I think by the time they 
built the taps, they didn't put enough glue in order for [them] to stick for a long time ... when 
you open the tap, it [the tap itself] comes out." Most residents agreed and complained that the 
taps could be pulled out with little or no effort. One enterprising woman pulled the tap out of the 
pipe connected to it, and then stored it in a drawer in her shack. She claimed she did this so no 
one could steal it to sell on the black market. When she needed water from the tap, she 
reconnected it to the pipe, and then removed it again when she left. Although this prevented the 
plastic faucet from getting stolen, other residents were then unable to use it. 
Whilst various faucets had been broken by the sheer weight of buckets being hung on them -
whilst being filled - others were leaking as a result of the careless way they had been installed. 
Almost every resident spoken to complained of leaky taps that caused water to run down the 
sides of the toilet facilities, through the soil, and into their shacks. Residents began to remove the 
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taps themselves and tum off all the water to the communal block - toilets included - using the 
control valve to the water mains. Significantly, no resident I spoke to said they knew of any taps 
that had been stolen for monetary gain. This implies that the missing taps were deliberately taken 
by residents in order to prevent further destruction from leaky faucets. Water trickling down 
from leaking taps was compounded by the problems of annual flooding and constant sewage 
overflows. 
4.3 Alternative Uses of the New Infrastructure 
The new communal blocks of toilets and sinks acquired alternative uses to the intended ones 
because they were in a state of disrepair that did not allow for proper usage. For instance, the 
new facilities had taken on the function of playgrounds or jungle gyms for small children. 
Because there were no parks, open fields, or spaces inside shacks for children to play, I often 
observed children playing with their friends in the gullies and on the manholes covering the 
collection chambers. Sticks and little stones that they played with then entered into the drains and 
Picture 4.1: Sewage overflowing from the gulleys below the washbasin 
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may well have been items that blocked the whole vacuum sewage system. 
Children played in the toilet facilities - not because their parents were negligent - but because the 
only other place for them to play was in the streets where, as parents often complained, there 
were no speed bumps to reduce the reckless driving that made the streets very dangerous for 
children and adults alike. Despite parents' efforts to keep children away from the toilets and 
streets, it was nearly impossible to monitor their children's every move. One frustrated parent, 
Sipliwo, said, "It is difficult because these toilets are near us, so sometimes you go outside and 
you leave the baby in the house, but when you come back the baby is out playing there [in the 
toilets and gullies]." 
Playing near toilets and grey water drains that were overflowing with sewage caused many 
children to get sick. Parents showed me new rashes and sores that their children had got from 
playing in toxic, bacteria- and virus-infested water. This was a daily occurrence during my 
fieldwork. Parents were not ignorant of the dangers of sewage, but, because of their 
circumstances - living in small shacks with no room for children to play inside and at the same 
time in close proximity to the toilets - they were unable to prevent their children from playing 
in the new communal facilities. 
Also, the new facilities took on the function of a large trash receptacle. In many of the communal 
blocks, trash littered the floor of the individual stalls and filled the wash basins. Though no 
residents admitted to this, it was obvious, when looking into the stalls and the water basins, that 
some individuals were using the new facilities as places to discard their trash. Some residents 
attributed the trash to the wind and to dogs. However, in the absence of trash receptacles located 
nearby and infrequent refuse removal provided by the municipality for their large dumpsters, I 
frequently observed residents casually leaving their rubbish behind at the facilities when walking 
by them. One resident suggested that people had become complacent in the informal settlement 
because they were used to 'ugliness' and 'dirtiness', and that it was sensible to discard rubbish in 
an area that no longer served any other practical purpose. Residents' use of the infrastructure as a 
rubbish dump definitely contributed to its condition of disrepair. However, it was uncertain 
whether they had started using the facilities in this manner because of sheer disregard for 
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something they did not own or whether they had started to use it in this way because it did not 
work in the manner expected of it - along with various other municipally provided services such 
as garbage collection. 
4.4 Use of Container Toilets 
Since the new flushing toilets were not functional, the residents had reverted to using container 
toilets. In Chapter One I mentioned that households had been provided with individual container 
toilets in 2005 - to replace their self-dug and unstable pit latrines. Each container toilet consisted 
of a hard plastic, green portable container holding up to 50 litres of human waste. It had two 
handles, one on each side, to carry it away for cleaning. Kosovo's container toilet cubicles were 
typically brown and conical-shaped, although a few shacks had cubicles within a single, concrete 
slab stall with a corrugated iron door. 
Container toilets had a negative reputation among both residents and C of CT officials, 
commonly being associated with impoverished conditions, inadequate sanitation and infectious 
and water-borne diseases. Needless to say, they were regarded as undesirable by the residents. 
Yet, those who lived in Kosovo in 2005 recognised that they had been 'lucky' to have been 
provided with one container toilet per household rather than to have to share with others. 
However, as indicated, those who had settled there after the container toilets had been provided 
did have to share. During the period of my research, and despite the presence of flush toilets, 
residents on some residential sites still shared a container toilet with up to five other households. 
Almost all the residents spoken to claimed that, prior to moving to Kosovo in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, they had had access to outdoor flush toilets in their previous urban residences. 
These were usually shared by the family in the main house along with backyard shack dwellers. 
It was thus quite a change and a rude awakening for some, when they moved to Kosovo, to find 
that it had no sanitation system at all. Moreover, the container toilets provided in 2005 did not 
compare with the flush toilets they had been used to, and residents complained that they 
represented a step down from what they had had before moving to Kosovo. As one resident, 
Palesa, said: "We used to use them [container toilets] in the olden days in the rural areas, not in 
the townships, especially not in the squatter camps because there are a lot of people." Another 
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woman, named Nkosazana, remarked, "I'm stayin' in cold here ... and I'm suffering about the 
toilets. I now have to go out[side] and at that time [when I lived in Pinelands, Cape Town] the 
toilet was inside." 
Palesa's comment indicates that residents viewed container toilets as a technology that is 
satisfactory for rural areas where only a few people use a single toilet, but not for their current 
conditions in a densely populated urban area. Nkosazana's comment about going outside points 
to the embarrassment associated with having to walk in full view of neighbours every time one 
needs to perform one's most private bodily functions. Physically speaking, for Nkosazana and 
many of the residents, there was also the discomfort associated with walking outside in the rainy, 
cold and windy winter months in order to relieve oneself, a discomfort I too experienced during 
my research which was conducted during the winter. These comments indicate that, far from 
being satisfied with container toilets that were assumed to be a step above a pit latrine, residents 
had been disappointed that they did not offer the comfort level of the toilets to which they were 
accustomed. 
Container toilets were also disgusting to see, and especially to smell. According to Sarah, an 
unemployed, single woman living with her mother, "You are not supposed to look in when you 
use a toilet" because several days worth of urine and faeces would be visible. Others complained 
about the flies that accumulated around the toilets and flew into people's shacks. These flies, 
according to many of the residents, carried diseases such as tuberculosis. Mangaliso, an 
unemployed man living on his own, elaborated on this idea, "Yeah, we got it [TB] from the 
toilets because faeces are a part of the thing that we cannot sit normally with it (sic)". It was 
common to hear residents associate container toilets with disease. For them, the build-up of 
effluent and the flies contributed to an overall 'dirtiness of the atmosphere', which, they said, 
ultimately caused diseases. This is not unlike the aetiologies that people of Swaziland attributed 
to their diseases when they described unseen agents "in the air" that were said to cause illness 
when they were breathed in (Green, 1986: 115). With up to five shacks using each container 
toilet, it is no wonder that they filled up quickly and produced strong smells, which fostered local 
beliefs about disease aetiologies. 
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The rapidity with which the container toilets filled up demanded that they be cleaned and the 
excrement pumped out regularly. According to Alphonso Barry, one of the municipal officials in 
charge of maintenance, his department had hired a contractor, Toilet Warehouse17, to clean the 
container toilets in Kosovo three times a week. Typically, residents said, when Toilet Warehouse 
came to clean the toilets (See picture 4.2), the faeces and urine were simply emptied out of the 
container into a larger container in a truck and then transported to a sewage plant. Later, some 
ladies, also employed by Toilet Warehouse, would clean each container with chemicals and 
sweep out the cubicle. 
When the container toilets were cleaned in this manner and on time, residents were usually 
satisfied and had few complaints about the cleanliness. However, aside from a few residents that 
confirmed Barry's statement about thrice-weekly cleaning, most residents indicated that each 
Kosovo container was cleaned professionally only twice weekly, pushing the limits of the 
containers' capacity. One resident said that her container toilet was cleaned only once per week 
and, towards the end of my research period, she complained that her container toilet had not been 
Picture 4.2:Container toilets with the container out for cleaning 
17 Pseudonym used to protect the name of the company. 
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emptied or cleaned in over two weeks. She claimed she had thus had to turn people away from 
using her toilet because it was overflowing with faeces and urine. 18 
When Kosovo residents had heard they were going to be provided with flush toilets as part of the 
settlement upgrade, most were reportedly very eager and elated. As Ben Mozi, a community 
leader said, "At the time they were building the toilets the people were happy, but after they were 
finishing ... people are not happy". For them, this was an opportunity to bid good riddance to 
container toilets that they and indeed the state regarded as wholly inappropriate in any context, 
especially high density populations. They had expected the new toilets to halt - or at least slow 
down - the occurrence of diseases and embarrassment they associated with container toilets. 
However, the new vacuum sewage system did not work, so residents lost their enthusiasm for 
their new toilets and went back to using container toilets, despite the flies, unpleasant sights, and 
strong smells. 
4.5 City of Cape Town vs. Kosovo Residents 
From discussions I had with residents, the disastrous conditions of the new communal blocks had 
led some to despise the entire development project along with those who participated in its 
conception and implementation. Likewise, the C of CT officials in charge of its implementation 
and maintenance were frustrated with the consequences of the project, which led to their almost 
indifferent attitude towards the project. There seemed to be a mutual tension between the two as 
regards the new water and sanitation system upgrade. On the one hand, the C of CT portrayed 
Kosovo residents as unclean, abusive, vandalising and ignorant, because they attempted to flush 
improper anal cleansing material (e.g. newspaper) and threw their trash in and around the new 
facilities, which may have caused some of the blockages. On the other hand, Kosovo residents 
portrayed C of CT officials as political opportunists, incompetent and uncaring. These views 
stemmed from the fact that neither party took the opportunity to really understand the other's 
point of view. They each had separate objectives and neither seemed really to want to understand 
the other's point of view. In this situation, the developers and the Kosovo residents began to talk 
"past each other ... certain unspoken political and cultural imperatives were responsible for 
18 When toilets did not get cleaned properly, residents often came to me, hoping that I could bring someone to get 
the job done. 
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many a crossed signal, and ... very slow movement was attributable to different agendas and 
priorities (often hidden) held by the various parties" (Mason, 1986: 141). 
For example, John Graves, the project manager, blamed the improper functioning of the new 
system on the residents' negligence and sheer lack of respect for the new system. He said: 
Unfortunately it [the sewage system] cannot take abuse and that is unfortunately what we're 
having in Kosovo. People are abusing the sewer system ... We took out disposable nappies. 
We took out rags. We took out stones, cans, you name it ... pieces of food, everything [was] 
coming out of the sewer system ... that is a problem and to get the message across to the 
community not to ... to use the system and not to abuse it ... that is the problem. 
In Graves's mind, the disrepair and blockages could not possibly have been from any faults 
within the system or its construction. Only the residents could possibly be culpable. The ward 
councillor during the time of my research, Anele Gwetywa, completely disagreed with Graves, 
saying, "John, in his explanation about the blockages ... I took his explanation as an insult ... 
[He said] the reason there are blockages is that there are things thrown into the toilets like stones, 
and sheep skins ... This is a pure fabrication of the situation on the ground". 
In Graves's explanation to me about the "abuse", he depicted the residents as ignorant and 
uneducated about how to use a flushing toilet: 
But you must remember many of these people, they come from the Eastern Cape ... they 
haven't seen a toilet ... a flush toilet in their life before ... [It's] something new. I read, the 
other day, of a child of four years old [he] was playing with his puppy and his puppy was 
dirty and decided to wash his puppy ... this little boy he took his puppy and put it in the toilet 
and said I'm going to wash you. Now this was a small child that's growing up in that 
environment; now what do you expect of a four-year-old child that has never seen a flush 
toilet before; he's used to a pit latrine. 
It is quite common for developers to paint a portrait of those who are being developed as 
ignorant and underdeveloped - in order to justify interventions (Hobart 1993), or in this case, to 
rationalise a project's failure. Furthermore, the kind of deprecating illustration offered by Graves 
is one that effectively "equates their moral and social status with their ability to manage sewage" 
(Ross, 2005: 637). 
However, as we have seen, Graves's example does not apply in the context of Kosovo. Most of 
the residents there were not directly from rural areas of the Eastern Cape. In most cases they had 
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moved from other locations in the Cape Town metropolitan area. All the residents I spoke to had 
lived with their own flush toilet prior to their move to Kosovo, so they were well aware of the 
proper ways to use such toilets. 
For their part, residents attributed the blockages not to their own behaviour and ignorance, but 
rather, to the C of CT's shoddy and inadequate work and materials. Some residents commented 
that the municipality had insidious intentions and the upgrade was only a political manoeuvre to 
show voters that they were doing something for the people. Residents were no strangers to 
various political parties showing up in Kosovo during the months leading up to municipal, 
provincial, and national elections, all claiming they were going to help residents in their plight. 
After the elections, however, the same politicians would disappear and, in people's experience, 
as several residents expressed it, little was ever done to remedy their situation. Therefore, it is no 
surprise that they told me that the municipality had no intentions of providing them with 
something that worked or could be maintained. Below are a few comments that substantiate this: 
There were all these new toilets that were made but ... some of them did not even start 
working; but the government officials were here to see and make sure everything was built 
right ... the company that was doing all this work was paid for incomplete work ... The 
budget for all this was something like 20 million bucks. Are you going to tell me the entire 
amount was not enough to provide excellent services to this underdeveloped Kosovo 
Community? 
They trick us in our minds because we didn't know ... It's like a little kid who doesn't have 
enough to eat. If you give a kid a slice of bread, now he can take it without seeing there is a 
poison in it. 
There was no planning with the toilets ... I think they didn't sit and plan it properly. It's like 
they just did it so they could say 'we did something for them.' 
These verbal descriptions of each other on the part of both the C of CT and the residents often 
painted each other in a negative light. Though there are elements of truth in each construction, 
they both tried to portray themselves in a positive manner so that they did not have to be 
accountable for their own actions. Graves, the project manager, did not want to bear the onus for 
expensive maintenance problems; therefore it was easier for him to put the blame on the 
residents for all of the blockages. Likewise, residents did not want to claim any responsibility for 
trash that ended up in the sewerage system, so they condemned the municipality for creating a 
substandard product that did not work properly. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
The C of CT's attempt to provide Kosovo with a water and sanitation system upgrade using 
vacuum sewage systems was a complete catastrophe. From the moment of completion to the end 
of my fieldwork, the system never worked as intended. In fact, for the duration of my research, I 
only ever saw one toilet that flushed properly. The result of this development project was a set of 
disastrous effects: sewage openly flowed into neighbouring shacks; it produced foul odours and 
sights; and it forced residents to resume the usage of container toilets which they despised and 
saw as a symbol of embarrassment and unrefmed living. 
The situation in Kosovo is another example where the question: 'Which came first: the chicken 
or the egg?' becomes pertinent. Was the disrepair caused by residents' use of improper anal 
cleansing materials that could not be flushed, the use of the facilities as trash receptacles, their 
allowing their children to play in the units and put stones into the system, and/or their attempts to 
minimise overflowing sewage by covering the drains with boards? Or were these actions a result 
of the toilets not working from the beginning due to second-rate construction and poor 
understanding of local people's needs? While it is impossible, in retrospect, to deduce which 
caused which, it is undeniable that the project failed. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: FAILURE TO CONSULT, INFORM AND SET 
UP LOCAL MANAGEMENT 
"We in the community are also important stakeholders that are not actually recognised by 
other stakeholders such as the government ... We are not central in our development; we 
are not in control of our development. It is only the government that is imposing on the 
people. There is no input from the community - who at the end of the day - is going to live 
with this development for their entire lives and it is going to affect them on the ground ... 
we are not given choices." (Anele Gwetywa, ward councillor) 
5.1 Introduction 
The Kosovo water and sanitation system upgrade was an ongoing and complicated process that 
started in 2005 and was ostensibly completed at the beginning of 2009, although few if any 
facilities worked properly upon completion. Upon my arrival in Kosovo in June 2009, only a few 
taps and toilets were operational. The remainder were not working and were in a state of 
disrepair. For residents and the various stakeholders involved in the project, the question 
remained: Where did this well-intentioned project go wrong? There are several answers to this 
question; in this chapter I focus on one in particular. I examine the C of CT's failure to 
adequately consult, involve and inform residents about the development project throughout the 
entire project cycle. The development project did not involve different types of continuing 
dialogues and consultations with residents in order to complete the new toilets and taps. 
Occasionally, during the upgrade, C of CT officials attempted to inform residents about the new 
system and its technology. However residents were not adequately informed about the overall 
development process and their options for technology and design. Furthermore, after the 
completion of the upgrade, the C of CT failed to set up a local management system to deal with 
toilet allocations and maintenance protocol. In this chapter, I elaborate on these claims and 
demonstrate precisely where the C of CT fell short. 
5.2 Informing and Consulting Residents 
In contemporary development work it is commonly accepted - and recommended by 
anthropologists-to use a participatory approach. Participation in development research refers to 
one of three possible opportunities for locals. As Gardner and Lewis (1996: 110-111) argued, 
locals can and should be: 
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1. given access to development project plans and have the opportunity to reflect upon, 
comment, and critique them; 
2. allowed to offer their own services that can be useful in implementation and maintenance 
of the project; or 
3. allowed to use their own initiatives and actions to bring about 'development'. 
It is claimed by several anthropologists that participatory methods offer several advantages. They 
allow locals to become empowered (Grillo, 1997) by giving them a voice and opening up new 
spaces for political action (Williams, 2004), as well as allowing them to analyse their own 
problems in order to bring out socially relevant solutions. They also allow developers to pre-
empt some of the problems encountered with development programmes (Hess, 1997), such as 
making false assumptions about the beneficiaries (Pottier, 1993). In other words, participatory 
methods act in "facilitating meaningful communication between development personnel and 
local people to establish what each has to offer, informing science and what it might offer, so 
that they can better understand the alternatives available in addressing problems" (Bicker and 
Sillitoe, 2004: 3). 
However, as indicated, participatory methods were not used in Kosovo. According to the 
residents, no C of CT officials approached them to ask them what sanitation technology would 
be appropriate for their circumstances, how they would like the toilets and taps to be built, what 
materials would be practical, and how the hiring of workers should be conducted (see Chapter 
Six). Rather, John Graves, the project manager, had consulted only Urban Engineers- an 
engineering consulting firm located in Cape Town - about these matters. One of the Community 
Liaison Officers (CLOS),19 Mangaliso Vande, said, "We were taken by the C of CT as 
wheelbarrows to tell the people, to force them to go out [relocate for construction of the 
communal infrastructure], but when we want to share our ideas with the C of CT, they will tell 
us, 'No man, this is not a community meeting, this is a technical meeting'." This quote 
demonstrates that some residents, particularly the community leaders and CLOs, felt used by the 
C of CT, who apparently only valued them to get their dirty work done. 
19 Community Liaison Officers were residents hired by City of CT to inform other residents about the upgrade and 
ask residents to relocate their shacks during construction. 
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When I met with Graves, I asked why the residents had not been consulted or presented with 
possible options for the upgrade. He indicated that the residents lacked knowledge about the 
technical aspects of upgrading infrastructure, implying that it would be a waste of time to use a 
participatory approach for their development. "It was not participative planning; otherwise we 
would've still been busy planning ... Sometimes ... especially when people are not technical, it's 
difficult to reach consensus on what you can do and what you can't do." What his words suggest 
is that Graves made the false assumption that the residents could not contribute anything useful 
to the design or the implementation, because they were ignorant of engineering and city planning 
expertise. 
Bob Storm, the director of Urban Engineers Consulting - who was in charge of providing 
Kosovo with rudimentary services - offered a different explanation for why he did not consult 
residents. "We didn't feel it necessary to engage with the community because it doesn't really 
affect them - as far as flushing it away - whether it's a conventional gravity sewer system or a 
vacuum sewer system. Their concern is what they come into contact with, which is a flush 
toilet." While Storm mayor may not have been correct in this assumption, he did not consider 
the other aspects of conducting an upgrade. My research shows that residents were not particular 
about the technology behind the services they received; but they did care about how and where 
the facilities were to be constructed. Residents, especially former CLOs, had strong opinions 
about this: 
What we need ... is the municipality to come to the community and ask the community, 
'What would be alright for you?' It's us who use these. We know what is right for the 
squatter camps (Xoliswa Phiri, former CLO). 
Before you do anything for the people, you must just ask them what they need. Just because 
you have money to do it [doesn't mean you should]. . .it's just like taking money, if you say 
this is the first thing or second thing in Africa to be done (Mangaliso Vande, former CLO). 
Firstly, the C of CT has to sit with people and ask their permission. Of course, they are 
staying here in the shacks, but still [residents] have rights ... they have to sit and talk to people 
and explain before they do anything ... and whatever you do, you have to think about the 
people who are staying there ... because these people [in the municipality] they didn't plan 
and they were not professionals (Vuyiswa Mzima, young resident who attends a post-
secondary training programme for nursing). 
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These quotes indicate that residents would have appreciated the right to choose, even if they 
ended up agreeing with the consultants in the long fUll. They wanted to feel as if they were 
integral to their own development. 
Not only did the C of CT neglect to elicit residents' insights and opinions during the planning 
phases of the project, they also failed to keep them informed during the actual implementation of 
the vacuum sewerage system and the communal facilities. All they did to inform residents was to 
host a series of meetings to which residents were called prior to the commencement of and 
during the upgrade. However, according to residents these measures fell short because they 
either did not know about the meetings or were unable to attend them due to time conflicts. 
According to Graves, the meetings informed residents of everything they needed to know about 
the upgrade. "Everything about the track, the toilets, the sewer system, water ... it'll be shared 
facilities; everything that we could think of, we shared with them." However, others shed a 
different light on what they were told at community meetings: 
We were told that the sewage system is actually a German pilot project. It was fIrst used in 
Africa, in Botswana and so on and so forth. But they were unable to tell us exactly ... what 
are the challenges, advantages, and disadvantages of that system (Anele Gwetywa, ward 
councillor during and after implementation of upgrade). 
They didn't explain how it is going to w rk or who is going to use what, but they said they 
are gomg to implement the flushing system (Thandiwe, community leader during the 
upgrade). 
These comments indicate several issues. Firstly, the residents who attended the community 
meetings were given only very basic information, like what type of technology was being used 
and where it came from. They were not given practical information, such as how the toilets 
would be allocated and about the strengths and weaknesses of the particular technology. If 
Graves's sessions had, in fact, provided them with this information, as he said they had, the 
residents did not remember it. Graves also indicated that they had held several different meetings 
over the course of the few years they had been busy upgrading the settlement. The meetings, he 
said, had taken place in venues like community halls or the yard in front of the local Spar shop?O 
Despite this, at most only about three hundred residents had shown up - though he did not 
indicate whether they were the same or a different set of attendees each time. This poor 
20 Supermarket chain in South Africa 
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attendance explains, however, why most of the residents I spoke to claimed they did not know 
about the meetings and that no general information had been disseminated to them. Some 
residents told me that they were aware of some meetings, but they were working or in school, so 
they could not attend. 
Despite Graves's claims that there had been various consultative meetings with the residents, 
Storm of Urban Engineers said that he had participated in meetings with community leaders and 
CLOs only, and not with any of the residents in general. It was the CLOs' duty, he said, to 
inform residents about the upgrade and to convince certain people to relocate if their shack was 
on a site that was scheduled to be occupied by a future pump station, road, or a communal toilet 
facility. He also said that, after these meetings, the CLOs and community leaders had the task of 
going to different residential sites to convince people that their shack had been chosen for 
relocation or to be located next to the new toilets. Many residents objected, because they did not 
want to reside near smelly toilets. 
The CLOs said it was a tough time for them because they faced a lot of resistance from those 
residents. Xoliswa, my research assistant and a former CLO said, "The people, they come to my 
shack ... a group of people! And they tell me 'Why do I do that to them?' It was very tough ... 
they come to me and they say, 'Why you sell us to these white people?' And I tell them, 'No, we 
want development, please, and it will be all right!' but now it's not all right." Xoliswa's words 
here indicate how powerful development discourse had become in the process of convincing 
people to relocate. Many of them were very hesitant and well aware of problems that might stem 
from communal facilities (i.e. foul toilet odours and strangers using nearby toilets and leaving 
behind messes); yet several residents indicated to me - such as Nkosazana, an older domestic 
worker - that they had moved and agreed to live near to the toilet blocks for the sake of 
'development' that carried connotations of normal and proper living standards. 
Aside from telling residents that they must relocate their shack for construction or that a new 
toilet block was to be located near their shacks, CLOs did not provide residents with any other 
information. Both Mangaliso and Xoliswa, two of the CLOs, said this partially stemmed from 
the fact that they were themselves given very little information about the technology and its 
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operations at the meetings they attended with Graves and Storm. Also, there appears to be a 
disjuncture between what the municipality and consulting engineers said the CLOs should do 
and what they actually did. Despite Graves's and Storm's expectation that CLOs would 
communicate the information they were given at the meetings and ensure it reached all residents, 
Xoliswa told me they only went to houses located in the immediate areas of construction. She 
said that she thought it was their job to make sure those residents were ready to relocate for 
construction, not to convey any other information about the upgrade to all the residents. This 
thus left a large number of residents without any information about the upgrade. 
In addition to not having been informed about the upgrade during implementation, most residents 
claimed they had never officially been informed about the completion of the new water and 
sanitation system. A few informants said the contractors had told them they were ready for use, 
but failed to provide them with any information about their correct or proper use. Moreover, 
most residents to whom I spoke asserted that they had found out from neighbours who had 
simply started claiming toilets for themselves by putting locks on them. Their comments 
included statements like: 
The company just left on the last day without giving any last progress and financial report to 
this poor Kosovo community. I think the company knew something was not right with their 
job and that is why they did not call the community to give the last report. 
The person that built the toilet here, he just built the toilet, and he didn't come maybe after a 
week when they finish and say 'you must use it now'. They must come and check if the toilet 
is right. 
Such comments were made, despite Graves having claimed that he had hired a man from Samora 
Machel to notify residents when the toilets had been completed at the beginning of 2009. Graves 
also asserted that, in the community meetings held prior to the upgrade, he had informed the 
residents about the proper use of the new facilities. To remind the residents of their proper use, 
he said, the C of CT had also created posters, written in English and Xhosa that were meant to be 
put on each communal facility, with information about materials that should not be flushed and 
what type of sewerage system had been built. However, at the start of my research in June 2009, 
nearly six months after the completion of the toilets, my colleagues from the University of Cape 
Town and I found the posters stacked up in the system's pump station, and the residents were 
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adamant that they had never seen them on the toilet units. Indeed by the end of July, when I had 
completed my fieldwork, no posters had appeared on the communal facilities. It seems as though 
what little information most residents received had reached them by word-of-mouth from the few 
residents who had obtained and managed to retain the small amount of information conveyed at 
the earlier community meetings. 
5.3 Setting up Local Management 
Comments quoted in the previous section from Thandiwe implied that the C of CT's officials 
had failed to inform residents about how toilets would be allocated upon completion; how they 
should be maintained and cleaned; and how blockages and malfunctioning facilities should be 
fixed or by whom. In other words, what she had said was that when construction and 
commissioning of the toilets had supposedly been completed, the municipality had failed to set 
up a local system to manage them. This is one particular instance where a participatory approach 
would have been useful. For example, the C of CT could have facilitated a forum for community 
leaders and residents to discuss how they would like to allocate particular toilets and delegate the 
responsibility for them. Because the municipality did not do this, the toilet-claiming process 
became quite chaotic and, as will be shown later in this section, led to some conflict. 
While conducting my research, I heard three different stories regarding how the residents were 
informed of the toilet completion and how they had then claimed the new toilets. Some people 
said that, upon completion, the contractors21 had put locks on some of the individual toilet stalls, 
and a number of residents reported that, before leaving Kosovo, the contractors had 
recommended that they form small groups of five or six shacks to claim a toilet. In compliance 
with this recommendation, those individuals who had actually spoken to contractors went to their 
neighbours and asked them if they would like to form a group in order to claim and share a toilet. 
According to a resident who was a part of one of these shack cohorts, he and the others in his 
particular cohort combined their money and bought new padlocks for the toilet they used because 
the contractors left before providing keys for the padlocks they had placed on the toilet cubicles 
- padlocks that had now to be broken before being replaced. 
21 They were hired to build the new infrastructure after it had been designed by Urban Engineering consultants. 
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Most other residents described a different way they were informed about the completion of the 
toilets. They claimed that they heard from neighbouring residents, rather than from the 
contractors, that the toilets were completed and then went to break the lock on a stall and put on 
their own padlock for their own individual house. Contrary to this, some residents said that they 
found toilets without locks and were able to easily put on their own padlock without having to 
break ones that were already on them. 
Graves tells a completely different story however. Graves had said that the municipality had 
employed someone explicitly to inform residents when the toilets in their section had been 
completed and were ready for use. This person was not hired by the contractors nor was it 
supposed to be the contractors themselves, as they were not paid to tell the residents how to 
claim the toilets. However, when asked, no resident I interviewed indicated having received this 
information from a C of CT worker. Furthermore, Graves said that residents were already using 
the toilets before all of them had been completed and before the C of CT had a chance to develop 
a plan for toilet allocation. The lack of communication and participation resulted in residents not 
being informed about the toilets' completion in a uniform manner, as well as some residents 
receiving a toilet to use, albeit unofficially, while others did not. According to various residents, 
this part of the upgrade was disorganised and inconsistent. How people claimed toilets varied 
from shack to shack, and followed no discernible pattern based on location within the informal 
settlement. 
Those who had been lucky enough to claim their own toilet used padlocks to keep random 
individuals out of 'their' toilets, so that the residents who used them could maintain cleanliness 
of these toilets. If an individual who did not belong to the cohort for a particular toilet needed to 
use it, they had to ask someone to lend them a key. However, having to ask individuals for keys 
every time the toilet was needed led to conflict and annoyance among neighbours. Since the 
residents were never told or provided a means to decide which individuals should be responsible 
for particular toilets, they gave out keys to any individual who needed to use the toilet 
throughout the day, whether they wanted to let them use it or not. These particular residents did 
not want to clean up the mess of strangers; yet, because they did not own the toilet, they felt 
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obligated to let others use their keys. This changed, and by the time I conducted my research, 
most residents who owned keys to the toilets refused anyone the right to use 'their' toilet. 
Since none of the toilets were working properly, they did not want to give others the opportunity 
to cause further property damage or instigate more sewage blockages and overflows. This was 
especially true for the residents who lived nearest to the communal blocks. They claimed that 
others, who did not live near the toilets, had no incentive to stop using the toilets when they were 
in disrepair because they did not have to live next to them when they were overflowing with 
sewage. In one particular example, a young woman described how she and her neighbours had 
locked a toilet that was not working and then denied another neighbour access to the toilet: 
[During] the time they tell us the toilet is not working, the other lady just come and use this 
bucket to flush the toilet while the toilet is not working. When you flush the toilet, the 
water is coming out and also right at the back [the gulley] the water is coming out. So we 
tried to tell the lady, 'You have to stop using the toilet' ... now we go to that lady ... and tell 
her she cannot use the toilet until it is all right. And she said, 'If I want to use the toilet, I 
will use it', then she started shouting, 'I will hit you. I will go to court. I will call the 
police'. So I went to the police station because the day I was talking to her, she bring the 
bucket with the urine and throw inside here on my head .... Since then, we never talked 
agam. 
This case reveals just one set of problems that has presented itself in Kosovo since the 
completion of the toilets. Many of the residents I spoke to seemed exasperated by the situation. 
Several people claimed they had initially bought proper toilet paper to use, but then gave up 
because they thought it was pointless to continue purchasing it when others were disrespecting 
the toilets by creating messes and blockages. 
Added to the fact that residents were never presented with an opportunity to discuss the 
allocation of the toilets by the C ofCT, they were not given a protocol for maintenance when the 
toilets were in disrepair. Some residents living alongside the communal facilities said that they 
had never seen any person come to fix the toilets near their shacks, though most claimed that 
they had seen the contractors come at least once to look at the toilets. The residents who 
witnessed this thought that the contractors lacked the technical know-how to fix vacuum 
sewerage systems, since the toilets continued to block after their departure. Some said: 
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They don't send people to fix. They only send people to suck [sewage and garbage from 
toilet basins]. You know? This is a bucket system [a type of container toilet] now. This is 
not a flushing system. 
They must come and check if the toilet is right. These toilets, these ones in front of me, 
they are not right. They are not working, as from when they finished it. No one has come to 
inspect the toilet and its condition. 
Some other day there was a blockage and there were some guys from the C of CT that 
came to unblock the pump station. And then I asked them why they leave, because they left 
without solving the problem. They said, 'No. The system that was put there was vacuum 
pumps' so they don't know anything about it. They were going to bring people who know 
about the vacuum pumps. 
Alphonso Barry, one of the municipal officials in charge of maintenance, also said that the C of 
CT did not have any in-house expertise to deal with vacuum sewerage maintenance problems, 
which raises the additional question: Why did they implement a ne  system they could not 
adequately maintain? 
Another source of frustration for the residents was that they had no-one to whom they could 
report maintenance issues. Prior to the upgrade, Graves said, he had told some of the community 
leaders that, if there were a problem with the new toilets, the C of CT would find out from the 
equipment in the pump station and come to fix the maintenance issue. As Thandiwe, one of my 
research assistants who was also a community leader, elaborated on what they were told by 
Graves: "What happens is there is some sort of signal [in the pump station] that actually works as 
an alarm and, in fact, shows up on the municipality computer screens; and once they see that on 
their screens ... they come and attend to the problem." Anticipating the likelihood of 
maintenance issues in the future, she added, the community leaders had asked about how else 
they should report problems with the new toilets; to which Graves reportedly responded that the 
technological equipment in the pump station would do all the necessary reporting for them. 
Unfortunately, however, the process did not work that way in practice. 
5.4 Conclusion 
Kosovo residents were not consulted about the technologies and facilities in their upgrade 
package prior to implementation. Moreover, this trend continued during the implementation 
process and even after completion. Most of the residents I spoke to were given little information 
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about the entire development process: when the toilets would be ready for use; the advantages 
and disadvantages of vacuum sewerage; and ultimately, who would be responsible for the 
cleaning and maintenance issues associated with particular toilets. Allowing residents the 
opportunity to comment, critique, and question the design and construction of the infrastructure 
has the potential to avoid some of the pitfalls described in Chapter Four, because only the 
residents can be fully aware of the various complexities of sharing facilities in a densely 
populated settlement. Additionally, the C of CT could have been more instrumental in organising 
the community to create a local management system that allocated and maintained the facilities. 
Because none of this happened, the toilets fell into a state of disrepair and eventually could not 
be used as intended. Residents described, ad nauseum, a vicious cycle of disorder that ensued, 
whereby residents would allow complete strangers - both residents and visitors - to use toilets 
they had claimed for themselves. Many of those individuals would leave behind messes and use 
inappropriate anal cleansing materials that blocked the toilets. Because no protocol had been 
established by the C of CT to report maintenance problems, nor had individuals within Kosovo 
been trained to deal with blockages, the toilets stayed plugged for weeks on end. Eventually, 
those who had claimed particular toilets for themselves also gave up on cleaning them and 
buying toilet paper - precisely because the system did not work and their own toilets also ended 
up being dysfunctional - a situation which perpetuated the problem. This cycle, in combination 
with a lack of information and participation, left residents with little pride in their new facilities 
and scorn for the municipality that had built them. 
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CHAPTER SIX: THE FAILURE TO UNDERSTAND LOCAL 
TENSIONS, RULES, AND POLITICS 
One day after arriving in Kosovo, I noticed an abnormal amount of commotion in the 
street that separated Kosovo from Samora Machel. A couple of hundred people were 
marching in the streets, singing old freedom songs. Every few metres or so, there were 
conspicuous columns of smoke emanating from piles of blankets burning in the street. I 
also saw a Samora Machel resident tipping over Sanitech toilets filled with excrement and 
urine. In response to these activities, the police charged the scene and scared people off by 
shooting rubber bullets. I quickly walked to Xoliswa 's shack to ask her what was going on. 
She replied that the Kosovo residents were protesting because they wanted the government 
to build them houses and bring proper development. She explained: 
I don't know whether the municipality or government know about us ... because 
nothing was happening here at Kosovo unless we do that noise ... to make that noise 
of protesting. It helps us here in South Africa because after you make that noise the 
government come to you and know about you. I don't know if the government was 
knowing about Kosovo [before we protested}. 
She also said that the residents were tired of getting blankets from the disaster relief 
agency every time they were flooded. She and others were convinced that blankets would 
not solve their problems, but houses would and the government would not come to their aid 
unless they resorted to extreme measures, such s protesting, violence and destruction. 
6.1 Introduction 
Protests like that described above, as well as fighting with fists and words among local residents, 
were very common in the settlement. To the municipality and press, such violence may seem 
futile, destructive and contra-indicated, but to the residents violence became a mechanism to get 
the attention of those whose help they sought. Underlying all the violence and protesting was a 
desire to be seen and heard, to be understood and taken seriously. This chapter examines the 
reasons residents ofKosovo have historically engaged in protest, violence and conflict, and what 
this ultimately has meant for the development process. 
Both municipal officials and residents spoke of delays and setbacks throughout the upgrade 
process. Most had resulted from conflicts related to the desire for residents' own form of local 
representation, as well as the need for the municipality to hire local workers, using local, 
unwritten rules as guidelines for the employment process. In this chapter I argue that the 
municipality's failure to understand residents' needs has fostered local tensions and resulted in 
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delays for the upgrade, ultimately contributing to a dysfunctional water and sanitation system 
upgrading. 
Underlying the municipality's failure to understand what residents wanted is that officials did not 
engage with any 'indigenous or local knowledge' prior to commencing the development project. 
According to Bicker and Sillitoe (2004: 2), indigenous knowledge is generally, "any 
understanding rooted in local culture. It includes all knowledge held more or less collectively by 
a population that informs interpretation of things". The term 'local knowledge' refers similarly to 
"knowledge and skills related to a specific place". These issues need to be "culturally and 
ecologically situated" (Antweiler 2004: 3). In the case of Kosovo, an 'ethnography of local 
history', was necessary (Ellis and West 2004), so that oral narratives could be used to examine 
the local knowledge of the legal system, local conflict management, and local, but unwritten 
rules at play in such a development context (c.f. Antweiler 2004). Often, development projects 
fail because they are planned without any consideration for how they fit in within the larger 
structures of local practices (Curry 2003). Simply put, "lack of understanding, 
miscommunication and negligent behaviour are ... quite regular occurrences in development 
projects around the globe ... [M]any development practitioners tend to see those they deal with 
as basically identical to themselves in their way of experiencing the world as objectively given" 
(Hess 1997:5). The following two examples demonstrate why the C of CT needed to engage with 
an 'ethnography of the local history' ofKosovo. 
6.2 A Ward Councillor of their own 
Cape Town is divided into several wards, each represented by an elected official, called a ward 
councillor.22 Kosovo is within Ward 33 which encompasses Philippi, West Philippi, Samora 
Machel, and Weltevreden Valley. Prior to the council elections of 2006, some Kosovo residents 
had decided that they wanted their ward councillor to be from Kosovo, as opposed to another 
22 Wards are geographical areas composed of approximately equal numbers of voters and are established by both 
local and metropolitan municipalities (Schedule 1, Part 1, MStA). It is the municipal government that is responsible 
for providing sustainable services and a healthy and safe environment to the residents of wards (Section 151-152, 
Constitution). 
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suburb in the ward because, as I was told, they said that only someone from Kosovo could truly 
understand their hardships and do something to remedy them. During periods of flooding prior to 
that election, different companies regularly made charitable gifts to Kosovo, but the residents 
complained that they saw the gifts going directly to the ward councillor and to residents in 
Samora Machel who already had formal housing. They had become tired of Samora Machel 
residents and the ward councillor, Vusi Chambers, benefiting from their plight, while they lacked 
even the most rudimentary services. Before they decided to promote their own candidate, 
however, they protested for the removal of the then current ward councillor. My research 
assistant, Xoliswa, related the story of their initial protest: 
We went up and down, trying to remove Chambers. We ended up going to the parliament, 
protesting. At that moment he started to come with bucket toilets. He tried to confuse us 
[bribing them with bucket toilets] because he took us to be idiots. We were the people at 
Kosovo whom he used. We break and fall down [destroyed] those bucket toilets ... By the 
time we break and fall the toilets, Mozi [another prominent Kosovo resident] tried to fight 
and save those toilets. The community beat him and he ended up in the hospital ... It was a 
civil war. 
The former mayor of Cape Town, NomaIndiya Mfeketo, took an interest in their protest and met 
with the residents to address their concerns. After this meeting she decided to convince the ward 
councillor in another ward, Mary Mashaba, to take some interest in Kosovo and help them out 
since Chambers was very unpopular. Several residents told me they were happier once Mashaba 
started helping them out, but they still wanted their own representative from Kosovo. This 
prompted, Zukile Mava, a prominent Kosovo man, to run for the African National Congress 
CANC) party nomination in the ward councillor elections. Unfortunately, he had not been a 
formal member of the ANC for at least a year, as party rules stipulated, and was disqualified 
from the ANC election. Instead, Anele Gwetywa won the ANC nomination, but had yet to win 
the council election. 
Zukile, having decided to run as the Independent candidate against Gwetywa, was heavily 
supported by Kosovo residents. They made t-shirts with his name on them and produced posters 
to put up in Kosovo. However, with lack of support from Samora Machel and the rest of Ward 
33, he lost the election. 
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His supporters did not want his rival, Gwetywa, to make decisions for them; consequently, they 
held their own unofficial community meetings in Kosovo. Two factions within Kosovo quickly 
formed: those supporting Zukile and those supporting Gwetywa. Xoliswa once again related: 
As Kosovo community we made a decision that we don't need him [Gwetywa] in Kosovo. 
We hold our meetings excluding him. There are a few people in Kosovo who favoured 
him. We fought with these people and vandalized their shacks. We were taken to Nyanga 
police station and arrested ... [then] the councillor started employing his favourites and we 
chased them and beat them in Kosovo. When we did that he called the police and arrested 
us. We became 2 groups in Kosovo: Zukile camp and Gwetywa camp. Because we 
vandalized their shacks they burned Kosovo. They moved to and stayed in Samora Machel. 
The residents' resort to violence and to court arrest testifies to the desperation they felt in not 
having their own representation. For them, however, it seemed to be the only effective means of 
getting noticed. After the election, both Xoliswa and Zukile switched allegiance to the 
Democratic Alliance (DA) political party since, as Xoliswa said, they had gotten nowhere with 
the ANC and with the Independent parties. 
This was around the same time when the municipality decided to provide rudimentary services in 
Kosovo. Yet bringing these services to Kosovo required residents, including Zukile and Xoliswa, 
to work closely with the newly elected ward councillor, Gwetywa, as well as with municipal 
officials since they were community leaders. However, some Zukile supporters, all prominent 
Kosovo residents, refused to co-operate with Gwetywa. In their minds, he knew nothing about 
their circumstances and would thus not act in their best interests. This halted the development 
project. As Graves, the project manager, said: 
But they said to us: no .... If that guy is part of the project we don't want the project. And 
one day I said to them: You know what, I pity you people. One day your children will 
come to you and that child of yours will ask you: "Mom, when I was small and I had to 
play in the mud ... when I wanted water, I had to drink stagnant water; dirty water, and I 
needed a toilet, your sister told me to go behind the bush. What did you do for me to 
improve my living conditions?" Then I pity you if you have to stand up, and you will say 
to your child: "Sorry, my child I did nothing but fight. I couldn't agree with other people so 
that is why we didn't provide you with better conditions. 
Shortly after Graves had reportedly said this to the Zukile faction, they decided they would rather 
work with Gwetywa to get toilets and roads than continue to fight. By this time, the factional 
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conflict had set the development project back nearly two years. An important point to note here 
is that Graves told me that the two different factions had formed because different residents 
belonged to different political parties and that it was this that had caused tension. However, as 
this 'ethnography of local history' indicates, this was ultimately not a struggle about party 
politics or particular party allegiances, but rather, a conflict rooted in a desire to have a 
representative who was a resident of Kosovo and could "feel their pain". They did not want 
development if it was just going to promote the ward councillor'S interests, as it had apparently 
done in the past. This was precisely what Graves did not understand, and why it took nearly two 
years to resolve the conflict. 
Ultimately, a compromise was reached in 2006, when the C of CT hired two Kosovo residents to 
act as Community Liaison Officers (CLOs). Their job, according to Graves and Storm, was to 
represent the Kosovo residents' views in planning and steering committee meetings, although, as 
we have seen from their own reports, the CLOs' opinions were not listened to in those meeting. 
Nonetheless, they were tasked with informing residents about the upgrade. However, as the next 
section shows, their hiring caused additional delays and exacerbated local tensions even further. 
6.3 Sharing Work 
Peace in Kosovo was short-lived. According to Xoliswa, one day, at one of the initial project 
committee meetings, she was appointed as a CLO by the municipality. Having told Zukile she 
was not sure what the job required, he called a DA councillor to explain a CLO's role. 
Discovering it was a paid position to inform residents about the upgrade, he told her that her 
appointment required community approval. She thus stepped down, pending the community's 
approval. The next day, however, Zukile himself applied for the position and was appointed 
instead of Xoliswa to represent Kosovo on behalf of the faction that supported him when he ran 
in the council election. Yandiswa Mkansi, a young, female resident of Samora Machel, was also 
appointed, to represent the supporters of the ward councillor. Xoliswa said that she felt slighted 
by this betrayal. 
Zukile and Yandiswa were CLOs until 2007. During that time, Xoliswa said: 
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The rule at Kosovo said people must share work. People were supposed to work for three 
months and give the others work after that. He [Zukile] was the one who came with that rule. 
Now, because he is working, he doesn't want to share because money is very nice. Zukile 
forgot about the people who fought for him. 
Xoliswa was speaking of an unwritten rule in Kosovo: if an individual received a job within 
Kosovo, they could only take it for a few months, and then they were expected to give it up, so 
that others would have an opportunity to work and make money, as jobs were scarce. Zukile, 
however, was unwilling to do this, even though he was reportedly one of the original people to 
espouse this imperative.23 
In 2007, Xoliswa said, she had decided that it was time for a change in Kosovo. She was not 
happy that the same two people had been employed as CLOs for over a year. According to her, 
in January 2008 at an informal community meeting, the residents decided together that it was 
time to appoint new CLOs. A few days later, they appointed Xoliswa and Mangaliso Vande as 
the two new CLOs. Within a couple of days of having been a pointed, they said, they had gone 
to work from shack to shack, informing residents who would have to relocate in order to make 
way for the construction of the new water and sanitation infrastructure. 
A few days into their new job, however, Zukile had shown up for work and insisted that he was 
still the CLO. Xoliswa related the story: 
[Zukile] said it is him who comes with development at Kosovo. He was like a person who 
is mental. Every day they go to work and stay in the office. He said he could stop that 
development. When we held meetings he came because he claimed he was a CLO. When 
he was tired, he went to CCMA [Commission for Conciliation, Mediation, and 
Arbitration]24 He said it was an unfair dismissal. He demanded R32,000 from January to 
July to re-imburse him for his work. 
From what Xoliswa and Mangaliso told me, Zukile continuously threatened to stop construction 
if he was not allowed to keep his job. The C of CT and the contractors were faced with a 
dilemma. Zukile and Yandiswa technically were entitled to be paid because they had signed a 
23 Unfortunately, I did not get to speak with Zukile to corroborate this story, because he had been shot during the 
time of my research and spent several weeks recuperating at a friend's home outside ofKosovo. My other research 
assistant, Thandiwe, as well as a few other residents also supported this story. 
24 The Commission for Conciliation, Mediation, and Arbitration is an independent body formed to resolve labour 
disputes. 
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contract. However, Kosovo residents were clamouring for Mangaliso and Xoliswa to become the 
new CLO's. Once again, according to Xoliswa, Graves sided with the community and allowed 
them to take over Zukile and Yandiswa's positions. This prompted Zukile to go to the CCMA 
arguing that he was the victim of unfair dismissal - a case he won and for which he was then 
paid out by the contractors who were building the new facilities. Because Zukile and Yandiswa 
were locked into a contract, they technically had the right to get paid. 
After their contract had been formally ended by the contractors and the C of CT, Zukile 
continued to make Xoliswa's and Mangaliso's jobs difficult and even prevented the contractors 
from completing their job too. As Xoliswa angrily exclaimed whilst relating the story: 
All the time we worked Zukile monitored us. He was always going to the contractors and 
telling them that the CLOs and project committees were busy with community meetings. 
He also called Graves, telling him this story. Another time, he called a meeting ... with the 
D.A. councillors. They said they wanted to drop us because we were illegal [not on 
contract to conduct the work of a CLO]. The community always supported us. When he 
saw that the community was proud of us by the time of the building the toilets he went to 
the people who were in points [where the new toilets and roads would be built] and told 
them to refuse to move. Then he changed and started to fight development. There are 
points where we are supposed to have toilets, but he went to the people who were supposed 
to move and told them not to move.25 
This situation reveals discord resulting from a number of fundamental problems. The first is the 
C of CT's and Zukile's failure to recognise the "three-month employment" rule that was 
fundamental to Kosovo residents' notions of being good neighbours and citizens, particularly 
when jobs were scarce. That the C of CT did not know or understand that principle, provides an 
example of a lack of local knowledge that might have been uncovered had participatory methods 
been employed. For example, the C of CT needed to know how residents wanted their 
employment contracts to be made up, so as to keep the project on track for completion, and 
prevent local conflict. Furthermore, had they had such information they could have relayed it to 
the contractors who were in charge of hiring local workers for the infrastructural construction. 
25 The consultants provided me with a detailed map and layout ofthe new toilet locations. However, in my 
unofficial count of the facilities, I observed that several of the facilities located on the map of Kosovo were never 
completed, thereby corroborating Xoliswa's story. 
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The second fundamental problem underlying the local discord was that residents did not realise 
that their decision to appoint someone they wanted for the position of CLO did not mean that 
those individuals would necessarily be officially recognised by the municipality or the 
contractors. An assessment of how residents preferred to allocate local jobs and structure 
employment contracts could have prevented this problem. 
6.4 Conclusion 
On the surface, the two examples of local conflict presented here make it seem as though residents 
were directly to blame for the delays in development and the failure to complete all of the 
communal toilet blocks in Kosovo. Not only did the tensions cause delays and failures, but they 
promoted violence and destruction. Residents were far from innocent bystanders; but what I have 
hoped to have demonstrated is that some of the conflict, and the ultimate failure to complete all of 
the intended facilities, can be attributed partially to the municipality and its inadequate 
understanding of what residents wanted in regard to representation and employment. For them to 
have acquired this information would have required their conducting an 'ethnography of local 
history'. Had the C of CT officials taken the time to ascertain local knowledge about desires and 
unwritten rules, they could have pre-empted the problem of local representation, by dealing with 
locally accepted terms of employment - before the problem had blown out of proportion. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: FAILURE OF DEPARTMENTS TO WORK 
CO-OPERATIVELY 
While I was in Kosovo one day in June 2008 with some colleagues from UCT, Daniel 
Smith, from the C of CT Water and Sanitation Department, gave us a tour of the new 
facilities. My research assistants, Xoliswa and Thandiwe, accompanied us while Smith 
showed us examples of the new facilities that had been built - along with some of the 
already accumulated disrepair. Included in the tour was a visit to the pump station. Upon 
entering the pump station, some of us noticed a stack of approximately one hundred 
laminated posters containing information about the proper use of the new facilities. Smith 
said we could take one if we liked, but failed to mention what he would be doing with them, 
if anything. I only found out later, from Graves, the project manager who works in a 
different C of CT department, that the posters were supposed to be put up on each new 
facility as they were completed. He seemed disconcerted by the fact that his colleagues in 
the Water and Sanitation department had failed to do this. Perhaps more agitated than 
Graves was Xoliswa, who said, "The time we were at the pump station ... we saw the 
pamphlets [posters). You know? But they didn't give the pamphlets to us. Why they didn't 
give the pamphlets to us? It is because they know that this is not right ... They rob us. They 
only rob us. They play with us. If the toilets were finished, they were supposed to give the 
pamphlets to us. But they didn't do that. " 
7.1 Introduction 
The situation described above is indicative of the lack of co-operation that became apparent to 
me among the various stakeholders in the different municipal departments involved in the water 
and sanitation system upgrade. In this case two different departments had failed to support each 
other and to collaborate with the various tasks, with the result that the residents were not 
officially notified of the completion of the new sewerage system. As indicated by Xoliswa's 
comments above, this seemed to provide residents with their own 'proof that the C of CT had 
never completed the upgrade and had instead provided them with a substandard product. 
Regardless of C of CT's intentions, it is evident that, from the very beginning, the different 
stakeholders had offered each other very little assistance and collaboration. Each seemed to 
suffer from tunnel vision, limiting thereby what they saw to only a small fraction of what it takes 
to launch, complete and maintain a successful deVelopment project. 
According to Bicker and Sillitoe (2004: 3), "We cannot understand cultures by looking at 
individual parts in isolation; as complex systems they manifest emergent properties that we can 
only see when all the parts are working together. It is not possible to predict which cultural 
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domains might relate intimately with others; often unexpected practices impinge on one 
another". Likewise, we cannot completely understand what went wrong in failed development 
programmes by looking at individual development agents. Thus, I argue in this chapter that, had 
they worked together co-operatively, the Housing and the Water and Sanitation departments, 
along with the ward councillor, could have provided each other with the information and support 
that was needed to ensure the success of the project. Before participatory methods can be 
employed to gather local knowledge, there needs to be a solid foundation of co-operation among 
the various stakeholders. 
7.2 Level of Co-operation among Stakeholders 
It became evident to me that the various stakeholders were not working together co-operatively 
when the issue of maintenance for the new system arose among the residents. As stated in 
Chapter Five, residents did not know who was in charge of maintaining the system and fixing 
any broken facilities. Not only did the C of CT fail to set up a local management system, but its 
officials failed to provide adequately for a C of CT -run maintenance service. According to 
Graves in the Housing Department, after the implementation of the upgrade, officials of the 
Informal Settlements Water and Sanitation Department (Smith and Barry) were supposed to have 
taken responsibility for all the maintenance and cleaning-related toilet issues. Graves claimed the 
completion of the toilets occurred in January and February 2009; however, Barry contended that 
he only found out, in an e-mail from Graves at the end of May, that his department would be 
responsible for maintenance of the new system. This meant that there was a period of four to five 
months where there was no specific policy or procedure for the maintenance of the new toilets. 
Graves also claimed that the intended plan was for the Water and Sanitation department to send 
someone to Kosovo about once a week to see if things were working properly or in a state of 
disrepair. Moreover, if they had found problems with individual toilets or collection chambers, 
they were supposed to ensure that these were fixed. However, he said, this did not happen 
because his colleagues did not know how to fix vacuum sewerage-system related problems and, 
consequently, they were negative towards the new system and did not want anything to do with 
it. Noting their reluctance to get involved with maintenance, Graves said: 
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So you need constant maintenance, constant co-operation with the people on site and they are 
not prepared to do it. They don't want to touch it because it is a new system - although they 
were part of a group decision that was taken to use the system. Now they say: 'no, no, no, no, 
no, we are not involved, we were never involved and we don't want to know about the 
system' .... And now I'm stuck with it. 
Barry, on the other hand, did not seem to have a negative attitude about maintaining the system 
or fixing problems in Kosovo per se, but rather, seemed to be unhappy about how the handover 
had taken place. "To my knowledge there hasn't been any official handover [saying] here are the 
manuals, and this is the procedure you must follow, these are the maintenance items that you'll 
need in stock or here are the items, you know, for the next year. That hasn't been done." 
He also said that, within a week of the email in May, he had received so many complaints about 
the toilets from residents that his department had immediately sent the same contractors that had 
built the new sewerage system and infrastructure to Kosovo so that they could repair the 
blockages to the toilets and collection chambers. While doing this, Barry had added, the 
contractors had encountered operational problems that could only be fixed once they brought a 
vacuum sewerage expert to the site. Pending obtaining expert advice, however, Barry used a 
Samora Machel resident, named Siyabonga Nkosi, to monitor the cleanliness and the extent of 
disrepair of Kosovo's new toilets. By then, as indicated earlier, residents had reverted to their 
container toilets, which continued to be serviced, as previously. 
Nkosi had worked for the C of CT from 2006 until the time I conducted research. Prior to 
monitoring Kosovo's new infrastructure, he had been employed by Barry in other capacities. 
Specifically, he had been previously hired to monitor the toilets, taps, and roads in Samora 
Michel and also to provide Kosovo with chemical (container) toilets. He said that, even before he 
had officially begun monitoring the toilets and taps in Kosovo, none had been working properly. 
Complaining bitterly about how the system's maintenance had been conducted in the past, he 
said that, in March 2009, he had already told Barry and Smith about the problems he had 
witnessed in the new sanitation system. Allegedly, Smith had then sent the same contractors to 
Kosovo to fix the blockages in all of the toilets but, just one week later, residents were once 
again complaining about new blockages. When Nkosi told Smith about this, Smith told Nkosi to 
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take the complaints to Graves since; at that point, he did not understand it to be their duty to 
maintain the new system. 
In April 2009, Graves visited Kosovo to show some of my UeT colleagues the vacuum sewerage 
system, an opportunity Nkosi used to tell Graves what he thought was wrong - in front of a 
sanitation specialist professor of civil engineering. Nkosi told me, in our interview, that Graves 
had allegedly replied that he was the only one who knew how vacuum sewerage works and that 
Nkosi should therefore keep his opinions to himself - which led Nkosi to decide to limit his 
contact with Graves, since he did not respect his work and views. Interestingly, Nkosi confessed 
that, after this incident, he had gone to work every day, had had a quick look at all the facilities, 
and then spent the rest of his day talking to local taxi drivers about cars, because he was "tired of 
politics". 
Once again revealing the lack of teamwork, Barry of Water and Sanitation and Graves of 
Housing each provided separate solutions to the issue of maintenance. When I spoke to Graves in 
June 2009, he said that, from the following month, there would be a permanent office within 
Kosovo where the residents could report on any maintenance problems. He said that the Housing 
Department would provide an office worker for a few hours every day to take complaints from 
the residents about water and sanitation issues. A list of emergency contact phone numbers 
would be made available to residents so that they would know whom to contact in the event of a 
problem. However, by the end of my research in July 2009, this plan had yet to be implemented. 
Barry, in contrast, admitted to not having a solid maintenance plan for Kosovo, primarily, he 
said, because he still needed a couple months to develop the specifications and to advertise a 
tender for a contractor to take over the system's maintenance. Having done all of this, he said, 
they might even then only perfect the system in a couple of years. Regarding these plans, he said: 
We got the idea to outsource the maintenance, the community involvement, the telemetry, 
the monitoring of all the working parts of the system over the next two years. And 
hopefully that will tell us what the cheapest option is: should we do it in-house? Should we 
outsource? And what sort of community intervention has the best impact on the 
maintenance cost of this system? ... We need to keep track of all our interventions in the 
system. 
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While Barry and Graves were deciding how they should best implement their separate 
maintenance plans for the Kosovo water and sanitation infrastructure, however, residents of 
Kosovo continued to suffer from toilet blockages and overflows. 
While I was in Kosovo there were some obvious operational problems with the new vacuum 
sewerage system. It was unclear whether the C of CT had the expertise to deal with the 
maintenance issues, or whether certain departments simply did not want the task, and so they 
passed the blame and work on to other departments. In all probability, it was a combination of 
both. One thing is clear: the residents could not use the new toilets because they were constantly 
in disrepair and the C of CT was avoiding addressing the problem. This could have been an 
opportunity where the three different parties - Graves from Housing, Barry and Smith from 
Water and Sanitation, and Nkosi - could have worked co-operatively on maintenance-related 
issues. Instead of doing so, however, the two C of CT departments passed the buck between 
them whilst denigrating the efforts of the one man hired to report and keep track of all the 
maintenance problems. 
It is precisely because of such issues that Koenig (1988: 353) advocates that the development 
process should be negotiated throughout the duration of a project cycle. He contends, "Goals, 
meanings, and strategies are not simply negotiated once and accepted by all, but rather they are 
continually re-negotiated through the life of the project, as long as there are decisions to be 
made". In other words, it is not enough to have a good project design; in addition, there must be 
co-operation among all the stakeholders where negotiation is encouraged for any joint decisions 
that need to be reached. Yet, as indicated here, it is impossible for negotiations to occur when 
departments work independently of one another and when the only source of regular on-the-
ground information is completely ignored. 
While it is clear that the C of CT departments failed to work co-operatively, what is less obvious 
is their failure to utilise a key resource during the entire development process: the ward 
councillor. Admittedly, Graves had said he did not want to use a participatory approach (see 
Chapter Five), but at the very least he could have worked closely with Kosovo's elected 
representatives, first Chambers and then Gwetywa, who were ostensibly there to speak for 
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residents and to act in their interests. Like Nkosi, when I discussed it with him, Gwetywa 
expressed a feeling of exclusion from the development process. "You see, that project was 
actually decided in the board rooms. We, as the community, our input received deaf attention 
from the people who designed that project." Gwetywa thought that, at the very least, the C ofCT 
should have held meetings with him to discuss the needs and desires of residents, especially after 
his conflict with the Zukile faction had been extinguished. Instead, the meetings to which he was 
invited simply informed him about decisions that had already been made. As could be expected, 
this frustrated him: "We are not central in our development ... There is no input from the 
community who, at the end of the day, are going to live with this development for their entire 
lives and it is going to affect them on the ground ... We are not given choices". 
Inherent in effective co-operation is mutual aid and teamwork. The C of CT did not rely on the 
assistance the ward councillor said he was willing to provide. The ward councillor might have 
provided the necessary social information if they had used more inclusive, participatory 
approaches to the development project. 
7.3 Conclusion: The Key to Success is Co-operation 
As in any system, a development project is made up of different components and departments, 
each of which performs separate and unique tasks. While the specific tasks might vary from one 
department or person to another, they do not exist in isolation. Each must be cognizant of the 
others' role in carrying out and completing the project, not only to facilitate effective transitions 
from one phase to another, but to avoid tensions and the possibility of collapse. Furthermore, 
each component of the system must recognise the others' ability to perform a unique and useful 
task in providing all the information needed for the system to function. In short, for a system -
in this case, development - to function appropriately and successfully, there must be co-
operation. This is precisely what was missing among the various stakeholders of the Kosovo 
water and sanitation system upgrade. Because of the overall lack of co-operation, the system 
quite literally broke down. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION 
Like many failed development projects before it (see Chapter Three), Kosovo's water and 
sanitation system upgrade was, for residents and municipal officials, hugely disappointing and 
deemed to be unsuccessful. The developers intended to introduce a system that would provide 
improved access to water, as well as to provide a means for effluent disposal away from the 
settlement, so as to eliminate water-borne illness and foster healthy living. Despite the 
municipality's noble intentions, the upgrade failed to meet these objectives. Rather, it aggravated 
an already bad public health situation by producing sewage overflows, some trickling into 
residents' shacks, from the toilets and grey-water drains. This situation forced the residents to 
revert to using container toilets, despite their reputation for being unpleasant and symbolic of 
undignified living. I have argued that the main reasons for the system's failure lie in the 
municipality's inability to interact appropriately with all the stakeholders: officials did not 
employ participatory methods with the beneficiaries, nor did they adequately inform them about 
the upgrade; they did not make any attempt to gain an understanding of 'local knowledge' or 
history; and they did not function co-operatively with the other stakeholders. 
While I have presented these three reasons for failure in individual chapters, in practice they 
were not isolated from one another. By failing to achieve anyone of these objectives, the others 
were additionally less likely to be met. For this project to have succeeded, it would have required 
the municipality and all local stakeholders to work together as one unit, cognizant of each others' 
roles and of information that each could offer. Working co-operatively might have allowed the 
municipal officials to gain insight from the ward councillors and local officials such as CLOs 
about local history and knowledge. Their awareness of local rules and desires could have 
facilitated effective participation from residents, as well as helped to set up a local management 
system. Participation by residents, the acquisition of local knowledge, and the co-operation of 
stakeholders should have been fundamental from the very beginning, in order to make this 
project successful. 
Knowing the reasons why this particular development project failed has implications for the field 
of development anthropology. Analysis of the processes whereby this project was undertaken 
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shows that there was no inherent reason why it could not have succeeded. All of the reasons why 
the Kosovo water and sanitation system project failed were preventable if only the developers 
had simply taken time to understand the local rules, desires, and history, as well as adequately to 
involve local people throughout the project cycle. Because developers do not always have the 
training to access local knowledge and employ participatory methods, social anthropologists can 
be useful human resources for development projects. In development contexts, such as Kosovo, 
anthropologists have the potential to see cultural constructs and inform any development plans 
(Goldschmidt, 1986). 
One of the primary reasons development projects have unforeseen consequences, such as the 
broken system in Kosovo, is because they are naively conceived (Curtis, 1985). However, 
anthropologists have the potential to identify potentially unforeseen consequences and to reduce, 
even prevent, the harm development projects might do (Gow, 2002). This can be done by using 
participant observation and asking deep, probing questions, while interacting with the intended 
beneficiaries. By using such methods, anthropologists are able to gain access to local knowledge 
and history, as well as to understand local people's desires for how they might want to 
participate in such a development project. 
My own research project fell short of the ideal in that I did not have the opportunity to make 
recommendations to the municipality, see them implemented, and subsequently study and 
critique the effects. However, it does provide a starting point for developers who intend to 
implement a similar upgrade in a large, densely populated informal settlement. This dissertation 
demonstrates and reiterates some of the common pitfalls development programmes face. It 
suggests what might be done to avoid them. Most importantly, it proposes that development 
programmes should not simply be deemed as lost causes and abandoned - as so much of the 
post-development literature seems to imply. Rather, it suggests that developers should learn to 
work together as one unit, in order to decode local knowledge and employ participatory methods, 
and to use the skills of anthropological research to be able to do that. 
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APPENDIX I 
Brief from Project Leader of Water Research Commission (WRC) Project 
In recent decades the rapid growth of urban centres in South Africa has led to an increased 
demand for water and sanitation systems. This has resulted in difficulties for municipalities and 
provincial governments that are trying to keep up with the pace of urban growth and provide 
viable and inexpensive sewerage services, partiCUlarly in informal settlements that are densely 
populated. 
The cost of implementing the standard gravity sewerage systems for all infrastructure upgrades 
has become too great. Consequently, the Water Research Commission Project has been trying to 
improve waterborne sanitation in South Africa by looking at alternatives to conventional 
sewerage systems. One such alternative is the vacuum sewerage system that has already been 
piloted in Kosovo Informal Settlement in Cape Town. 
Professor Neil Armitage has asked a student of social anthropology to conduct a six week 
ethnographically based study during June/July 2009 in Kosovo informal settlement and to 
produce a report for the Department of Civil Engineering at the University of Cape Town - at 
most two weeks after the fieldwork has been completed. The overall goal is to assess the success 
- or otherwise - of a recent upgrade to the settlement in order to be able to guide the Water 
Research Commission Project as to whether similar upgrade processes should and could be 
implemented in other informal settlements. 
To do the above will require that you fmd the necessary means to establish the social and cultural 
acceptability to residents and local level municipal officials of the upgrade, particularly, but not 
exclusively, as regards the provision of toilets, taps, washbasins/troughs and grey water disposal 
facilities. 
The brief for the study requires you to research residents' and local officials' views of the utility 
- or not - of the toilets, taps, washbasins/troughs and grey water disposal facilities that have been 
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provided, as well as the ways those are managed and the extent to which they believe the 
facilities' management might be revised to accommodate residents' needs and use 
patterns/expectations. 
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